Key Concept
The Problem of Induction: A problem for reasoning about the future based on past experiences. How can we be justified in believing that patterns of events in the past will continue into the future?
Think about the best moments in your life. There are probably spectacular moments: throwing lively parties, playing music to a cheering audience, or winning big games. But there are probably many mundane moments too: sharing meals at a cafeteria, goofing off while studying, or playing your favorite video games. Almost certainly, a common feature of the best times of your life is the people around you, your friends. There were people in the audience cheering you on. There were people next to you eating or studying. There were people having fun with you. Other people are not incidental or unimportant parts of our lives. Rather, they are cherished centerpieces.
Before we delve into Aristotle, I want you to do two things. First, I want you to take out a piece of paper and think back to a time when you were meeting new people. Write down three “green flags” for friendship, or qualities that you look for in people when considering new friendships. Also write down three “red flags,” or qualities that would serve as a warning that someone is not the right match for you. Second, call or message two of your friends to ask them for three green and red flags in friendship too. Compare and contrast the lists that you make.
We often think that we know ourselves better than anyone else, or that we live and die alone. Aristotle disagrees here by calling friends other selves. This implies that friends know us as well as we know ourselves, and that friends live and die together. Friends are probably with us during the games of life, but if not, they will always get the play-by-play analyses.
Aristotle was elite in almost every sense of the word. He was born in 384 BCE in the Greek kingdom of Macedon. His father was a court physician, and his mother was from a powerful family. He grew up in royal courts. When he was a teenager, he moved to Athens to study under Plato (who himself was the most famous student of Socrates). Aristotle studied there until around midlife, when he was asked by his home kingdom’s king, Philip II of Macedon, to tutor his son and rising political star: Alexander the Great. Aristotle educated Alexander and other royals. After ending his tutelage of Alexander, Aristotle returned to Athens and founded his own philosophical school, the Lyceum. When Alexander the Great died, political controversy erupted, and Athens sought to execute Aristotle. Aristotle famously said that he “would not let Athens sin twice against philosophy” by executing him like they did Socrates, so he fled the city. He died in 322 BCE, having led an adventurous life and written foundational texts in logic, rhetoric, biology, physics, psychology, politics, art criticism, and philosophy.
Here, you’ll be reading excerpts from Aristotle’s best-known work, the Nicomachean Ethics (Nicomachus was the name of both Aristotle’s father and son). The Nicomachean Ethics is divided into 10 “books” (or what we call chapters today). You’ll be reading parts of two of the chapters, Books VIII and IX, which analyze friendship. Whenever Aristotle thinks about friendship, he consistently refers to two things. First, he points to the purpose of the friendship. That is, he evaluates the success or failure of a friendship based on whether it achieves what the friends wanted their friendship to do. Second, Aristotle focuses on the effect that the friendship has on the shape of someone’s character and life overall. More specifically, he judges friendships based on how they make you feel, how they serve your social goals, and how they make you into a better person who can live a fuller life. The full text can be found here.
Before beginning, I need to caution you against two common misunderstandings of Aristotle’s terminology in these excerpts. First, when Aristotle refers to “happiness” (Greek: eudaimonia), he has in mind a person who has developed herself into a full human being by becoming a good person and an important member of her communities. Aristotle is not concerned only about short-term emotions. For him, calling someone “happy” (eudaimōn) marks the success of her life; the term points out that she is living like humans should. Second, when Aristotle talks about “love” and “friendship” in these excerpts, those words are referring to the same Greek word (philia). “Friendship” and “love” are applicable to relationships that range from casual and Platonic (such as with work colleagues) to intense and erotic (such as with confidants or romantic partners) to familial relationships. He is permissive and expansive with the term. But he’ll distinguish the types of friendships with some precision.
Happy Person – Someone who has developed her entire self well and lived a complete and flourishing life. She is a real and positive example of how we should live.
Friendship – A relationship between two people who like each other, generally wish each other well, and have a goal for their interactions.
Useful Friendship – A friendship where two people set as their goal for their friendship some useful or utilitarian purpose, such as friendship between work colleagues. These friendships are plentiful and easy to form and dissolve.
Pleasurable Friendship – A friendship where people set as their goal for their friendship some pleasant goal, such as friendship between people who go out on the town together. These friendships are plentiful and easy to form and dissolve.
Virtuous Friendship – A friendship where people set as their goal for their friendship becoming good people together and living happy lives just because they value the good of their friends as persons. These are also known as “perfect” or “true” friendships. They are usually between people who are equally good. And they might be limited to people of equal social status, wealth, and power. Aristotle doesn’t think that any happy person will lack virtuous friends. But he thinks it’s likely that we’ll only have a few of this sort.
If you ask a philosopher a question, they almost always say, “It depends.” Philosophers are careful to qualify their opinions because they can think of many circumstances where their ideas might be wrong. But here, Aristotle makes shockingly few qualifications about friendship’s goodness. He argues that friendship is good for people in all circumstances.
Book VIII.1
For no one would care to live without friends, though he had all other good things. Indeed, it is when a man is rich, and has got power and authority, that he seems most of all to stand in need of friends; for what is the use of all this prosperity if he has no opportunity for benevolence, which is most frequently and most commendably displayed towards friends? Or how could his position be maintained and preserved without friends? For the greater it is, the more it is exposed to danger. In poverty and all other misfortunes, again, we regard our friends as our only refuge. We need friends when we are young to keep us from error, when we get old to tend upon us and to carry out those plans which we have not strength to execute ourselves, and in the prime of life to help us in noble deeds. […]
Again, it seems that friendship is the bond that holds states together, and that lawgivers are even more eager to secure it than justice. For concord bears a certain resemblance to friendship, and it is concord that they especially wish to retain, and dissension that they especially wish to banish as an enemy. If citizens be friends, they have no need of justice, but though they be just, they need friendship or love also; indeed, the completest realization of justice seems to be the realization of friendship or love also.
Moreover, friendship is not only an indispensable, but also a beautiful or noble thing: for we commend those who love their friends, and to have many friends is thought to be a noble thing.
Concerning the luck of life, friends can celebrate with us in good times and comfort us in bad times. Concerning age, friends can keep us from making stupid mistakes when we’re young, and they can help us to do things that we don’t have strength for when we’re old. Concerning social scale, friendships do more than benefit individuals; they hold communities together. Friends hold everything in common and always look out for the interests of their friends. For Aristotle, this is why we think friendships are one of the best and most beautiful things in life.
Even though Aristotle celebrates friendship as crucial for life, he is careful with the details. Here he gives his famous threefold distinction between useful, pleasurable, and virtuous friendships.
Book VIII.3
The kinds of friendship accordingly are three, being equal in number to the motives of love; for any one of these may be the basis of a mutual affection of which each is aware. […]
Those, therefore, whose love for one another is based on the useful, do not love each other for what they are, but only in so far as each gets some good from the other.
It is the same also with those whose affection is based on pleasure; people care for a wit, for instance, not for what he is, but as the source of pleasure to themselves.
Those, then, whose love is based on the useful care for each other on the ground of their own good, and those whose love is based on pleasure care for each other on the ground of what is pleasant to themselves, each loving the other, not as being what he is, but as useful or pleasant.
These friendships, then, are “accidental;” for the object of affection is loved, not as being the person or character that he is, but as the source of some good or some pleasure. Friendships of this kind, therefore, are easily dissolved, as the persons do not continue unchanged; for if they cease to be pleasant or useful to one another, their love ceases. […]
But the perfect kind of friendship is that of good men who resemble one another in virtue. For they both alike wish well to one another as good men, and it is their essential character to be good men. And those who wish well to their friends for the friends’ sake are friends in the truest sense; for they have these sentiments towards each other as being what they are, and not in an accidental way: their friendship, therefore, lasts as long as their virtue, and that is a lasting thing.
Again, each is both good simply and good to his friend; for it is true of good men that they are both good simply and also useful to one another.
In like manner they are pleasant too; for good men are both pleasant in themselves and pleasant to one another: for every kind of character takes delight in the acts that are proper to it and those that resemble these; but the acts of good men are the same or similar.
This kind of friendship, then, is lasting, as we might expect, since it unites in itself all the conditions of true friendship. …
It is but natural that such friendships should be uncommon, as such people are rare. Such a friendship, moreover, requires long and familiar intercourse. For, as the proverb says, it is impossible for people to know one another till they have consumed the requisite quantity of salt together. Nor can they accept one another as friends, or be friends, till each show and approve himself to the other as worthy to be loved. Those who quickly come to treat one another like friends may wish to be friends, but are not really friends, unless they not only are lovable, but know each other to be so; a wish to be friends may be of rapid growth, but not friendship.
The first two friendships that Aristotle discusses—useful and pleasurable friendships—are similar to each other. They are simple in purpose. Useful friends help each other do things; pleasurable friends have fun together. These friendships form quickly and dissolve quickly. If useful friends can’t help you anymore, they aren’t your useful friends anymore. If pleasurable friends aren’t fun to hang around anymore, they aren’t your pleasurable friends anymore. That’s OK. Working and having fun are important. And life is better with these kinds of casual friends.
But life also needs the real friends, the deep ones, the homies. Virtuous friendships, therefore, are a third type of friendship. Virtuous friends, rather than being interested only in what they can get from each other, are interested in their friends for their friends’ sakes. They want their friends to be good people for their friends’ sakes, and they simultaneously want to be good people themselves to deserve their friends’ affection. This takes time and commitment. And it means “eating salt” together, or enduring bad times. This is often when we figure out who our closest and best friends are. These friendships are special and rare, but life would be missing something without them, so they are worth every bit of effort to make and maintain. Additionally, virtuous friends help you and are fun to be around, so they’re useful and pleasurable friends too.
Here, Aristotle argues that virtuous friends need to be equals in terms of moral development and be good people. In contrast, useful and pleasurable friends do not need equality of development and might even be bad people.
Book VIII.4
For pleasure, then, or for profit it is possible even for bad men to be friends with one another, and good men with bad, and those who are neither with people of any kind, but it is evident that the friendship in which each loves the other for himself is only possible between good men; for bad men take no delight in each other unless some advantage is to be gained.
The friendship of good men, again, is the only one that can defy calumny; for people are not ready to accept the testimony of anyone else against him whom themselves have tested. Such friendship also implies mutual trust, and the certainty that neither would ever wrong the other, and all else that is implied in true friendship; while in other friendships there is no such security. […]
We may say that bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or profit, resembling one another in this respect, while good men, when they are friends, love each other for what they are, i.e., as good men. These, then, we say, are friends simply; the others are friends accidentally and so far as they resemble these.
Aristotle thinks that Batman and the Joker could be useful or pleasurable friends to each other, but not virtuous ones. Virtuous friendships can’t be formed with bad people because you can’t trust them to be good or to be interested in your good, even if they’re fun to be around or useful at work.
Aristotle says friendship isn’t just a feeling; it’s an action. Friendship isn’t just a one-off event; it’s a consistent aspect of your character over time. Good friends decide to live life together, and they enjoy living their commitment.
Book VIII.5
When friends are living together, they take pleasure in, and do good to, each other; when they are asleep or at a distance from one another, they are not acting as friends, but they have the disposition which, if manifested, issues in friendly acts; for distance does not destroy friendship simply, but the manifestation of friendship. But if the absence be prolonged, it is thought to obliterate even friendship. …
Old men do not seem apt to make friends, nor morose men; for there is little in them that can give pleasure: but no one can pass his days in intercourse with what is painful or not pleasant; for our nature seems, above all things, to shun the painful and seek the pleasant.
Those who accept each other’s company, but do not live together, seem to be rather well-wishers than friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friendship as living together: those who need help seek it thus, but even those who are happy desire company; for a solitary life suits them least of all men. But people cannot live together unless they are pleasant to each other, nor unless they take delight in the same things, which seems to be a necessary condition of comradeship. …
But it seems that while love is a feeling, friendship is a habit or trained faculty. For inanimate things can equally well be the object of love, but the love of friends for one another implies purpose, and purpose proceeds from a habit or trained faculty. And in wishing well for their sakes to those they love, they are swayed not by feeling, but by habit. … Each then, loves what is good for himself, and what he gives in good wishes and pleasure is equal to what he gets; for love and equality … are found in the highest degree in the friendship of good men.
For Aristotle, friendship is more than a potential to be a friend; friendship is actualized in spending life with another person doing the things that friends do. He is critical here of long-distance friendships, as well as friendships that have not been acted on in a while. Homies don’t just talk like friends; they live like friends.
Aristotle argues that friendship is sensitive to the political circumstances that the friends find themselves in. In corrupt governments, especially tyrannies, Aristotle thinks that friends will be almost impossible to find.
Book VIII.11
In the corrupt forms [of government], as there is but little room for justice, so there is but little room for friendship, and least of all in the worst; in a tyranny there is little or no friendship. … For there seems to be room for some kind of justice in the relations of any man to anyone that can participate in law and contract […]
And so friendships and justice are found to some small extent even in tyrannies, but to a greater extent in democracies than in any other of the corrupt forms [of government]; for there the citizens, being equal, have many things in common.
It is important to note here that Aristotle is far from progressive. He also thinks that, due to inequalities, wives cannot be friends with husbands or slaves with masters. The grimmest interpretation of Aristotle would be that he judged women and enslaved people as inferior to male citizens. He certainly gets close to this judgment in his work Politics.
Another reading, albeit just as grim but in a different way, is that Aristotle thought that in a society that actively oppresses women, minorities, or other classes of people, the stark political power differences ruin the possibilities of well-wishing, mutual affection, and moral development that are central to friendship. In American history alone, we could ask: Could those Black people enslaved at the manors of Geroge Washington or Thomas Jefferson befriend their captors? Could Cherokee or Choctaw people befriend American soldiers on the Trail of Tears? Could American citizens of Japanese descent befriend the guards in the internment camps of World War II?
For Aristotle, it is clear that friendship is necessary for a happy life. But for Aristotle, it is also clear that friendship is incredibly vulnerable to political circumstance. And if we think friendship is important, we ought especially to create circumstances where friendship is possible.
People change. When that happens, should friendships?
Book IX.3
Another difficult question is, whether we should or should not break off friendship with those who have ceased to be what they were. … But if a man admits another to his friendship as a good man, and he becomes and shows himself to be a bad man, is he still to be loved? Perhaps we may answer that it is impossible, as it is not everything that is lovable, but only the good. A bad man, then, is not lovable, and ought not to be loved: for we ought not to love what is bad, nor to make ourselves like what is worthless; but, as we said before, it is like that makes friends with like.
Is the friendship, then, to be immediately broken off? Perhaps not in all cases, but only in the case of those who are incurably bad: when their reformation is possible, we are more bound to help them in their character than their fortune, inasmuch as character is a nobler thing, and has more to do with friendship than fortune has. But a man who withdraws his friendship in such a case, would seem to do nothing unnatural; for it was not with such a man that he made friends: his friend has become another man, and as he cannot restore him, he stands aloof from him.
But suppose that the one remains what he was while the other gets better and becomes far superior in virtue: is the latter still to treat the former as a friend? Perhaps it is hardly possible that he should do so. We see this most plainly if the interval between the two be very considerable. Take, for instance, a boyish friendship: if one of the two remains a child in understanding, while the other has become a man in the fullest sense of the word, how can they any longer be friends, now that the things that will please them, and the sources of their joys and sorrows, are no longer the same? For not even in regard to each other’s character will their tastes agree, and without this, we found, people cannot be friends, since they cannot live together. …
Shall we, then, simply say that the latter should regard the former as no more a stranger than if he had never been his friend? Perhaps we may go further than this, and say that he should not entirely forget their former intercourse, and that just as we hold that we ought to serve friends before strangers, so former friends have some claims upon us on the ground of past friendship, unless extraordinary depravity were the cause of our parting.
Aristotle here considers two cases. I’ll add names and details to make them clearer. First, let’s consider Monica and Dan. Monica befriends Dan, but after a while, Dan becomes a real dirtbag. Should she break off their friendship? Aristotle says that no one would blame her if she did; only good people are loveable in the deep way that virtuous friendship requires. Dan is horrible, and this should affect her evaluation of him as a friend. But Aristotle makes allowance for Monica, if she and Dan had a long friendship before his change and if Dan’s badness seems like it could change.
Second, let’s consider Erica and Adam. What happens if Adam just becomes a better person because he matures, works on himself, gives back to his community, etc., and Erica does none of this? Here, the difference isn’t between good and bad but between decent and fantastic. Aristotle makes similar allowances here to the previous case, but he seems to say that even if the friendship ends, it should be acknowledged and remembered as long as the worse friend isn’t truly horrible.
Talk to two people who you know well, one person between the ages of 18 and 40, and one older than 40 (e.g., a good friend and a parent). You don’t need to collect any information about them. But tell them that you might talk about what they tell you in class in an anonymous way. Ask them the following: What is the biggest disagreement that you’ve ever had with a close friend? Were you able to work through it? Or was it something that ended the friendship? Would you have handled things differently in any way? Did the incident change how you interacted with other friends?
Aristotle sets up a debate here about happiness. His opponent seems to think that only individual character matters, and this implies that friends don’t matter for happiness. If you’re a good person, the critics might say, nothing else could make or break you. Aristotle thinks that this doesn’t make sense.
Book IX.9
Another disputed question is whether a happy man needs friends or not.
It is said that those who are blessed and self-sufficient have no need of friends; for they are already supplied with good things: as self-sufficient, then they need nothing more, while a friend is an alter ego who procures for you what you cannot procure yourself ….
But it seems strange, while endowing the happy man with all good things, to deny him friends, which are thought to be the greatest of all external goods.
And if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer than to receive benefits, and if it is characteristic of a good man and a virtuous character to do good to others, and if it is nobler to confer benefits on friends than on strangers, the good man will need friends to receive benefits from him.
And so people ask whether friends are more needed in prosperity or adversity, considering that in adversity we want someone to help us, and in prosperity someone that we may help.
Again, it is surely absurd to make the happy man a solitary being: for no one would choose to have all conceivable good things on condition of being alone; for man is a social being, and by nature adapted to share his life with others. The happy man, then, must have this good, since he has whatever is naturally good for man. But it is obvious that it is better to live with friends and good people, than with strangers and casual persons. The happy man, then, must have friends.
Why does Aristotle think the happy person has friends? To become a good person in the first place, you need other people. They help you when you’re down, and you help them when you’re up. So, you literally become more gracious and generous through others. Character can’t be separated from others. Second, it seems absurd to imagine that a great person living the best life doesn’t have friends. So, yes, for Aristotle, you do need to be a good person to be happy. But you also need other things, such as friends.
Books VIII and IX of Nicomachean Ethics provide Aristotle’s theory of friendship. Friends are people who like each other, wish each other well, and come to an agreement about why they spend time with each other. Given that we are social animals, we need friends. Useful friendships help us to accomplish practical things. Pleasurable friendships help us to enjoy our time living. We typically have many useful and pleasurable friendships with lots of different types of people for shorter and longer durations.
But if we really want to be happy and become good people, we also need virtuous friendships. Virtuous friendships are those where our friends love us for who we are and want us to become the best version of ourselves, and we wish the same for them. These friendships are rare because they take time to develop. We have to live with our best friends, talk about life, and endure trials together. But these deep friendships are so important for life that Aristotle could not envision a good life without them.
For an overview of Aristotle’s life and main philosophical concepts, check out this video by The School of Life, which includes a discussion of friendship around 4:48.
If you want to see how these ideas fit into Aristotle’s philosophy, read the Nicomachean Ethics, including his thoughts on happiness (Books I and X) and good character traits (Books II-V). His Rhetoric also has a famous excerpt on friendship (Book II.4). For a slightly different summary of Aristotle’s theory of friendship, check out “Aristotle on Friendship” at 1000-Word Philosophy.
This work has been adapted from The Nicomachean Ethics, a title from the eCampusOntario Public Domain Core Collection. This work is in the public domain. All images were created using Midjourney.
Trujillo, Glenn. 2025. “Best Friends: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX.” The Philosophy Teaching Library. Edited by Robert Weston Siscoe, <https://philolibrary.crc.nd.edu/article/best-friends/>.
The Problem of Induction: A problem for reasoning about the future based on past experiences. How can we be justified in believing that patterns of events in the past will continue into the future?
A Priori: Hume is using the term ‘a priori’ to denote the kind of reasoning that allows one to gain knowledge as relations of ideas—in other words, reasoning from one necessary, definitional truth to another.
Justification: the concept of justifying one’s thinking, or one’s beliefs, is important in epistemology. Roughly, one’s thinking or belief is justified when there is good reason for it, or when it is well supported or well evidenced. All of these are ways of referring to some connection between what we think or believe and what is, or to some way of at least making ourselves think that we are closer to the truth.
Inference: The psychological process of moving from one thought to another, such as moving from the thought “it’s raining, and I don’t want to get wet” to “I should get my umbrella”, or from “I am tired, and it’s getting late” to “I should get some sleep”. Nowadays, philosophers tend to use the term ‘inference’ to mean the same as ‘reasoning’, and tend instead to use the term ‘association’ to refer to movements between thoughts that are not based on any logic or evidence.
Matters of Fact: Knowledge that is gained by experience, such as by observing or experimenting with objects in the world. For example, knowing whether all swans in the world are white requires somebody to examine the many swans in the world and make sure they do not happen to discover a black one (and in fact, there are black swans!).
Relations of Ideas: Knowledge that is gained just by sufficiently clear thinking, without having to observe or experiment with objects in the world. For example, knowing that a triangle has three sides is something you can know just because of what it means to be a triangle, hence without having to carefully examine triangular objects that you find throughout the world.
Reasoning: Developing arguments to try and support the truth of one’s beliefs.
Causation: A relation between events, where one event (cause) is responsible for another (effect). Eating too much chocolate can cause the effect of having an upset stomach, and not getting enough sleep can cause someone to be grumpy.
Epistemological Theories: Theories about the nature and possibility of knowledge – whether, when, how, and to what extent we can know about reality, such as the physical world, or our own consciousness. For example, one epistemological theory says that we can gain understanding of our own consciousness by studying the brain, whereas other theories say that we can only gain knowledge of consciousness by reflecting on our own inner experiences.
Aristotle means “happy” in the sense of a person who has developed a complete character, lived a full life, and become a true example of human goodness.
Happy Person – Someone who has developed her entire self well and lived a complete and flourishing life. She is a real and positive example of how we should live.
This is where Aristotle defines virtuous friends. These are friends who you actually answer the phone for. These are the friends who you ask for advice on work, love, and life. They are the friends that celebrate you for being you, but they also tell you when you’re messing things up. Not only do they love you, but you love them and try to be the same kind of friend to them too.
This is where Aristotle defines pleasurable friends. These are your TikTok, Snap Chat, or Instagram friends, the ones you post to social media when you’re having a good time.
This is Aristotle’s explicit definition of useful friends. These are your LinkedIn friends, those who you like networking with at events or enjoy working with on projects.
Virtuous Friendship – A friendship where people set as their goal for their friendship becoming good people together and living happy lives just because they value the good of their friends as persons. These are also known as “perfect” or “true” friendships. They are usually between people who are equally good. And they might be limited to people of equal social status, wealth, and power. Aristotle doesn’t think that any happy person will lack virtuous friends. But he thinks it’s likely that we’ll only have a few of this sort.
Pleasurable Friendship – A friendship where people set as their goal for their friendship some pleasant goal, such as friendship between people who go out on the town together. These friendships are plentiful and easy to form and dissolve.
Useful Friendship – A friendship where two people set as their goal for their friendship some useful or utilitarian purpose, such as friendship between work colleagues. These friendships are plentiful and easy to form and dissolve.
Aristotle uses “friend” broadly for any relationship between people who like each other, wish good things for each other, and get something out of spending time together.
Friendship – A relationship between two people who like each other, generally wish each other well, and have a goal for their interactions.
Happiness – The final end and highest good of human life. The perfect good that objectively fulfills human nature and subjectively satisfies desire.
Happiness Criteria – The conditions that the true object of happiness must satisfy. They are: finality, intrinsic value, purity, internality, authenticity, stability, self-sufficiency, completeness.
Object of Happiness – The thing in which happiness essentially consists, the attainment of which will make us truly happy.
Highest Good – The greatest good for a human being.
Final End – The ultimate goal of human life. All of our other goals are chosen for the sake of this final end.
Constituent Principles – Parts of a material object that cause the object to be the sort of thing that it is, but that cannot be removed from that object (in the way that some properties can be gained or lost). For Aquinas, this would include things such as form (the structure of a material object) and matter (that which is structured). For example, Dylan’s form is his soul, and his matter is his body. His soul and body are distinct, but Dylan could not exist if he were not composed of both.
Accident/accidental property – A property that something can possess or not possess while still remaining the thing that it is. For example, Dylan could grow taller, or he could stop being musical, without becoming a different person. By contrast, rationality is an essential property of Dylan, since being rational is part of the “what it is to be” of a human being.
Subject/Suppositum – Something or someone that can bear properties but is not itself a property that something else can bear. Dylan can have properties, like being short or being musical, but no one can have Dylan as a property.
Property – A feature that an object has. For example, a ball could be orange, which means that the ball has the property of orangeness. In many cases a property can be gained or lost. The ball could be painted green, in which case it would gain the property of greenness and lose the property of orangeness.
Actuality – The being, or act of being, of a thing. For example, hot water is actually hot (the water is hot), even though it is potentially cold. Likewise, a boy is actually a human being (he is a human being), even though he is also potentially a full-grown man (and he will still be an actual human being when he becomes a full-grown man).
Potentiality – Ways a given thing can become different from the way it is now. For example, cold water is potentially hot, since it can be heated up, and an acorn is potentially an Oak tree since it can grow to full size under the right conditions.
Essence – The “what it is to be” of a thing. For example, the essence of a human being is to be a rational animal, and the essence of a cheetah is to be the fastest land animal.
Principle of Specialization – The idea that work is more efficient and more effective if each worker specializes in exactly one task.
Extrinsic Value – Value a thing has that is dependent on something else. Extrinsically valuable things are worth pursuing because they get you something else that is valuable. Money, for instance, is only useful because it can be exchanged for other things.
Intrinsic Value – Value a thing has independently or inherently. Intrinsically valuable things are worth pursuing for their own sake.
Adeimantus and Glaucon were Plato’s older brothers (along with an older sister, Potone). They were both honored for military valor at a battle with Megara. We know little about their lives otherwise. Potone had a son, Speusippus, who inherited leadership of the Academy upon Plato’s death.
Thrasymachus was a real person, who lived about 459-400 BCE moved to Athens from Chalcedon to become a sophist (a professional teacher and public speaker). Only a few fragments of his work survives
Prudence – Prudence is virtue wherein a person is able to choose, in any given situation, the course of action that will lead to greater happiness. For example, a prudential person knows when it is appropriate to continue a difficult conversation and when it is best to wait for a more appropriate time.
Pleasure – Epicurus would have us think about pleasure as coming in two forms: moving and static. Moving pleasures are the type that we experience in the process of satisfying a desire (this coffee tastes amazing!). Static pleasure is the feeling of being satisfied — no longer experiencing need or want (I am feeling so peaceful sitting in the park). Epicurus thinks these static pleasures are the best sort.
Epicurus believed that reality is composed of matter. This sets him apart from other philosophers of the time who, often influenced by Plato, believed that reality is composed of both the material and immaterial (like the soul, or the Platonic forms).
Happiness – Epicurus uses the Greek word “eudaimonia,” which is typically translated into English as “happiness.” Whereas today happiness is most often used to describe a momentary feeling (this new notebook makes me happy!) Epicurus means something more like a consistent state of well-being and contentment.
Unconditioned: an ultimate explanation of reality. For example, if I explain why it is raining today by appealing to some atmospheric conditions, I can always ask for the cause of those conditions, and so on. Only a cause that is not caused by anything else (something unconditioned) would give us an ultimate explanation.
Transcendental Idealism: Kant’s mature philosophical position. It holds that appearances are not things in themselves, but representations of our mind. It is opposed to transcendental realism, which identifies appearances with things in themselves.
Appearances (vs. things in themselves): things as they are experienced by us (also known as phenomena). They should be distinguished from things as they are independently of our experience (things in themselves or noumena).
Metaphysics: the study of what there is. Traditionally, metaphysics is divided into general metaphysics and special metaphysics. The former investigates the general features of reality and asks questions such as ‘What is possible?’. The latter studies particular kinds of being and asks questions such as ‘Does God exist?’ or ‘Is the soul immortal?’.
Reason: the faculty that knows a priori. Kant uses this term in a general sense (the knowing faculty as such) and in a specific sense (the faculty that demands ultimate explanations).
A priori: term denoting propositions that can be known independently from experience. For example, propositions such as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ or ‘The whole is greater than its parts’ can be known without recourse to any experience.
Make sure not to think that ‘unjustified’ means ‘false.’ Even if they are true, the point is just that this would not be something that had been shown.
‘Absolute’ might be a confusing word, here. Socrates means that the geometers are not reasoning about their drawing of the square, for example, but of the square itself. They do not conclude that, for the square they drew, the area is equal to the square of a side – they conclude that this is true for squares as an intelligible object, or, as Plato would say, the Form of the square.
By ‘science’, Plato means to be talking about all rational disciplines, including mathematics.
The form of the beautiful has to be perfectly beautiful because all instances of beautiful things are explained by it, so it has to be responsible for the highest possible degrees of beauty possessed by anything. Moreover, it has no trace of ugliness in it.
The form of the beautiful has to be immaterial because all the many beautiful things do not share any material – that is, they are all made of different stuff.
Form (εἶδος / ἰδέα) – Intelligible, immaterial, perfect entities that explain the unity among the many things which share the feature named by the entity (e.g., Beauty, Squareness, Oddness). For example, think of a square. There might be many different squares, but they all share features like having four sides of equal length. So, the Form of Squareness would include all of those features that make something a square.
Guardian – This is the name Plato gives to the ruling class in his ideal city. Think of them as philosopher kings – they have complete control over the organization of the state. The Republic is partially about why Plato thinks they would be needed for an ideal system of government and what they would need to learn to do the job well.
Plato has previously argued that we are made up of different parts. The first part is the appetitive which is responsible for our desires for food, sex, and other bodily needs. Then there is the spirited part, which longs for fame and honor. Finally, he identifies the rational part, which discerns what is good and bad for us through reason. The parts can all come into conflict with one another, and managing their relations is what Plato thinks justice is all about.
Soul (ψῡχή) – What Greeks meant by this word is controversial. For now, think of it as the thing that makes you different from a rock or other objects, the thinking and experiencing part of you as well as the part of you that acts and makes decision. You might use the word ‘mind’ or ‘self’ to talk about this.
Virtue – Virtues are the character traits that make a person good. For example, most people consider courage and generosity to be virtues. English-speakers usually reserve the word ‘virtue’ for human beings, but in ancient Greek the word can be more comfortably applied to other beings as well.
Was it his burly physique, his wide breadth of wisdom, or his remarkable forehead which earned him this nickname?
Aporia – A Greek term for “being at a loss” or “clueless.” Socrates often questions people until they have no idea how to define something that they thought they understood.
You might be confused by the word ‘attention’ below. In Greek the word is therapeia, from which we get the English word ‘therapy.’ It primarily means the same as ‘service’ as in ‘to serve,’ but shades into ‘worship,’ ‘take care of,’ and ‘attend to.’
Meletus – A poet and citizen of Athens and one of Socrates’ accusers. Amongst other things, Meletus accused Socrates of impiety and corrupting the youth.
Divine Voluntarism – The idea that God is free to determine even the most basic truths. If divine voluntarism is true, then God could have made it so that 2+2=5 or so that cruelty and blasphemy are holy and good.
Euthyphro Dilemma – The question, “Is a thing holy because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is holy?” The general idea of a forced choice (or “dilemma”) about the true order of explanation occurs often in philosophy and gets referred to by this term.
Essence – What a thing fundamentally is. A square might be red or blue without changing the fact that it’s a square, but a square must have four sides, so having four sides is part of a square’s essence.
Definition – The perfect description of a thing. A definition should pick out all and only examples of a thing. For example, ‘bachelor’ might be defined as ‘unmarried man,’ because all unmarried men are bachelors, and only unmarried men are bachelors.
In Disney’s retelling of the Hunchback of Notre Dame, the clergyman Claude Frollo orders the death of many Roma on religious grounds. It is clear, however, that he is really motivated by spite and his unrequited lust for the Romani woman Esmerelda.
Spanish conquistadors were shocked by the scope of ritual human sacrifice among the Aztecs, as hundreds or even thousands of people were sacrificed each year. The Aztecs thought that the sacrifices could repay the sacrifices the gods had made in creating the sun and earth.
Zeus – The god of sky and thunder in ancient Greek mythology, Zeus was depicted as chief among the gods and called the father of the gods and men.
Forms – The perfect, divine, and intelligible entities that exist independently of the physical world. They are comprehensible only through reason, not through our senses, and their existence explains the properties of objects in the physical world.
Recollection – The soul existed prior to birth; during this time it learned everything, and hence all learning is only recalling what we already know.
Immortality of the Soul – Unlike the body, the soul is not subject to physical death, because it is immortal and indestructible.
Philosophy – The practice of preparing the soul for death by training it to think and exist independently of the body
Death – Plato understands this as the soul’s separation from the body
Human Identity Across Time – Locke’s notion that any human stays the same across time if, and only if, it maintains the same (distinctively human) organizing structure of parts.
Substance Identity Across Time – Something is the same substance across a segment of time if, and only if, it continuously exists across the relevant segment of time without gaining or losing any of its parts.
Immaterial Soul – A personal thinking substance without any physical constitution.
Personal Identity Across Time – Whatever makes someone the numerically same person (i.e., that very person) at different times; according to Locke, it is a relation of first-person consciousness via memory.
Person – Locke’s forensic definition of person (pertaining to courts of law regarding the justice of praise, blame, reward, or punishment): a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.
The Prophet Muhammad is a central figure in Islam. He is viewed as the last of a long line of prophets, which includes Moses and Jesus. He is responsible for writing the Quran, which was dedicated to him by the angel Gabriel. His life and sayings are recounted in the Hadith; he is viewed as an exemplary role model of Islamic life and faith.
Exhortation — The method of understanding and interpreting Truth available to the common people. The majority of people take scripture literally and understand truth and right action based upon this understanding. They are persuaded by the vivid imagery of the Quran and the rhetorical exhortations of religious leaders. Averroes takes this to be lowest form of understanding
Dogmatic Discourse — The method of understanding displayed by those who, through natural ability and habit, are able to have a deeper understanding of the Quran, and of the truths it illuminates. These people know that not all of the scriptures are to be taken literally, and that greater underlying Truths are revealed by interpreting some elements allegorically. Still, they err on the side of dogmatism and literal interpretation whenever uncertainty arises. Averroes associates this way of thinking with Muslim theologians and views this to be the middle level of understanding.
Philosophical Inference – The type of understanding associated with philosophical demonstration or argument. This is the highest level of understanding, accomplished by a select few, who have a natural capacity for philosophy and proper philosophical training.
Law — The Quran (the central religious text of Islam) and, to a lesser extent, the Hadith (reports of what the prophet Muhammad said and did). Averroes is concerned with explaining how philosophy relates to what Muslims take to be the unerring Truth regarding God and the nature of existence, as they are expressed in Scripture.
Occasionalism — a theory claiming that God is the only true cause of changes in the world. For example, when you high-five me, you’re not really the cause of the stinging sensation I experience. God is the cause. Your high five is just the occasion on which God causes it.
Interactionism — a theory claiming that things in the world can truly cause changes in each other. For example, when you high-five me, you truly cause me to experience a stinging sensation in my hand.
Substance Dualism — a theory claiming that the mind (or soul) and body are two distinct and very different things.
Body — what it sounds like! The body is the physical part or aspect of a thing and has characteristics like shape, size, etc.
Soul — that part or aspect of a thing involving mental aspects of their existence, e.g., thoughts, feelings, decisions, etc. The “soul”, in this sense, is more or less just the mind.
Causal Interaction — When one thing acts (i.e., itself does something) and in so acting makes another thing change. For example, when you high-five me, you cause me to experience a stinging sensation in my hand.
God as God – The phrase “God as God” is basically a synonym for “God the subject.” In other words, it refers to God precisely in God’s status as an incomprehensible divine Other.
Incarnation – The Christian doctrine of the incarnation is the notion that the word of God became fully human in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It is closely associated with the doctrine of the trinity, which asserts that God the Father, God the Son (Jesus as the word made flesh), and God the Holy Spirit are one God.
Religious Fanaticism – In Feuerbach’s use of the term, a religious fanatic is someone who is unwaveringly faithful to God as an utterly mysterious superhuman being. They subordinate other things—especially the love of other humans—to submission before this divine other.
God the Subject – When Feuerbach refers to God as a subject, he is referring to the commonplace religious belief that God is a being who has various attributes, like a loving nature.
Faith Separates Man From God – Faith separates God from man in this sense: it treats God as a mysterious other, a being radically distinct from us.
Faith – Belief in and fidelity to a transcendent divine subject like God.
Orthodoxy – Orthodoxy refers to “right belief,” and it is concern with identifying heresies and ensuring that people believe and practice correctly.
Indirect Form of Self-Knowledge – Feuerbach’s view is that religious belief is a naive way of relating to our human nature and its perfections. It is naive or childlike because it treats these as external realities that belong to God. He believes a mature and contemplative person realizes these don’t belong to God, but rather to our species, abstractly conceived.
Above the Individual Man – The human perfections are “above the individual” insofar as no particular individual ever perfectly realizes them. They are abstractions.
Divine Trinity – Feuerbach is having fun here. He is using the theological phrasing of the Trinity to talk about human perfections. In calling reason, love, and freedom of the will “divine,” he means they are absolutely good; they are activities whose goodness is intrinsic to their practice or exercise. This isn’t a novel philosophical view. For example, Immanuel Kant argued that autonomy or a good will is the only thing which is unconditionally good.
Perfections – The end to which a faculty or power is ordered. For example, omniscience would be the perfection of the intellect. Traditionally, God is said to possess all perfections.
Love – When Feuerbach writes about love, he is referring to unconditional concern for others and the desire for fellowship with them. He is here asserting that love, understood in this sense, is the perfect activity of the affective faculty. In other words, our feelings and passions are fully actualized and engaged in an intrinsically valuable activity when we genuinely love others.
Infinite – The infinite is whatever can be understood as unbounded or unlimited. Human nature in the abstract is unbounded and unlimited. It is only bounded or limited in its concrete form as it is realized by particular material individuals.
Higher Consciousness – The sort of consciousness that mature human beings possess, but which other animals do not. It is “higher” than animal consciousness because it involves thinking abstractly about the form or essence of things.
Science – Feuerbach uses the term science in its classical sense, meaning systematically organized knowledge. Any body of knowledge founded on an understanding of first principles and the essences of things is a science in this sense.
Popular Sovereignty – The view that a government’s authority to rule comes from the people, making a ruler subject to the will of their citizens.
The Divine Right of Kings – The theory that kings are chosen by God and thus that political revolt is a rebellion against the will of God.
Synthesis – The prefix ‘syn-’ means “together,” so a synthesis “brings together” or combines elements of both a thesis and its antithesis.
Antithesis– An antithesis is the contradiction of a thesis. For example, internationalism could be understood as the antithesis of nationalism.
Thesis – In Hegelian terms, a thesis can be understood as a position or theory. Examples include any of the “-isms” that we discuss in science, history, and philosophy, such as Darwinism, capitalism, nationalism, etc.
Progressor’s Temptation – a unique temptation for those making progress in which pride impedes their further progress and leads to backsliding.
Progressors – those who are not yet expert Stoic practitioners, but who are also aware of the fact that they must change their lives in that direction. They are working on making progress.
Intellectualism – the philosophical view that our motivations and emotions are all judgments. The reason why you do something, your motivation, is because you believe it’s the right thing to do. The reason why you feel good or bad about something, an emotion, is because you believe that something good or bad happened to you.
Duties – acts of service, obedience, and respect that we owe to each other. The duties we owe to each other depend on what kind of relationship we have.
Askeses – exercises of Stoic thought and practice that make the lessons and habits of Stoic philosophy second-nature for Stoic practitioners.
Externals – things that are not under our control but that are all-too-easily confused with things that should be important to us, like wealth, status, and pleasure. Too many people believe externals like these are necessary for the good life, and the Stoic path is to focus not on these things but rather what is up to us.
The Fundamental Division – the division between things that are under our direct control and those that are not. The important lesson is to care only about the things we can control.
The Greatest Happiness Principle – A principle which says that actions are right insofar as they promote happiness and wrong insofar as they promote unhappiness
Higher and Lower Pleasures – Types of pleasures that differ in terms of their quality. Things like food and drugs create lower pleasures. Things like intellectual pursuits and doing the right thing create higher forms of pleasure.
The Doctrine of Swine – An objection that utilitarianism entails that if people would be happy rolling in mud, that’s what would be morally best for them to do, so we should reject the theory.
Utilitarianism – A normative theory of which actions are right or wrong. Utilitarianism says the right action is that which maximises utility.
Jeremy Bentham – Considered by some as the father of utilitarianism, Bentham was a moral philosopher and one of John Stuart Mill’s teachers
Epicurus – an ancient Greek philosopher and one of the first to advocate that the ultimate good is experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain.
Utility – The thing that is ultimately valuable in itself. For Mill, this is happiness, which he then understands as pleasure and the absence of pain.
Contract Theory – a modern political theory identifying consent as the sole justification for government. Contract theory is associated with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and more recently, John Rawls (1921-2002)
Prejudice – a foundational, strongly held, unreasoned (but not necessarily irrational) moral opinion or belief. We might believe, for example, that parents have special obligations towards their own children.
A Priori – a philosophical term of art meaning (in Latin) “prior to experience,” which refers to knowledge that is innate or arrived at purely through reasoning, like the truths of mathematics.
Rights – moral claims invoking immunity from (or entitlement to) some specific treatment (or good) from others. Commonly recognized rights include the right to free speech or the right to healthcare.
Reform – a change in the social order that originates from the existing character of society. An example would be market-based healthcare reform in a capitalist society.
Conservatism – a modern political ideology that aims to preserve and promote the existing (or traditional) institutions of society. These institutions typically include the rule of law, property, the family, and religion.
Contingent Being – A being that can fail to exist. Its existence is not guaranteed. This being might come to exist or it might not.
Necessary Being – A being that can’t fail to exist. Its non-existence is impossible. This also means that such a being has always existed.
Want to read more about why the infinite regress option doesn’t work in the Second Way? Check out Sean Floyd’s entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Efficient Cause – An efficient cause is something that directly makes another thing exist or move. An example of this is when I kick a ball down a hill. I am the efficient cause of the ball rolling down the hill because I make it move down the hill.
Infinite Regress: Begin with some fact. We begin to explain that fact by appealing to another fact, where these facts are related by either causality or dependence. To create the regress, you keep appealing to more and more facts about causality and dependence without end.
Actuality – An ability or action something is currently exercising. Imagine that I am sitting comfortably at my desk, and then I stand up to take a break from reading. In this case, I am now actually standing.
Potentiality – What something has the capacity to do, but isn’t currently doing. Imagine I am sitting comfortably at my desk. Even though I’m not currently standing, I have the capacity to be standing. So, even while I’m not standing, I have the potential to stand.
Theists and Non-Theists – A theist is someone who believes that God exists, while a non-theist does not. Non-theists include atheists, who believe that God does not exist, and agnostics, who are uncertain about whether God exists.
Glaucon – one of Plato’s brothers and one of Socrates’ main interlocutors in the Republic dialogue. In that dialogue, he challenges Socrates to provide a compelling justification for why one should be a just person beyond merely following conventions or avoiding punishment. This sets up Socrates’ defense of justice as intrinsically worthwhile. Throughout the Republic, Glaucon prods Socrates to fully explain his theories of the ideal society, philosopher-kings, and the Form of the Good.
Aristotle – a Greek philosopher (384-322 BC) who studied under Plato and went on to be one of the most influential philosophers to ever live. Simply called “The Philosopher” by Thomas Aquinas and others in the medieval period, Aristotle’s views would eventually be synthesized with Christian theology, laying the intellectual foundation for later scholarly developments in Western Europe.
Understanding – Socrates describes education as turning one’s “understanding” in the right direction. The word “understanding” here translates the ancient Greek term “to phronēsai,” which means “understanding,” “being conscious,” or “having insight.” People who are wicked focus their “understanding” on how best to accomplish their selfish and narrow desires. Those who are wise, in contrast, have learned to focus their “understanding” on what is truly good and beneficial.
The Form of the Good – Socrates characterizes the ultimate goal of education as coming to know “the Form of the Good.” The Form of the Good is his technical term for the meaning of goodness: what it is to be good. Socrates is clear that this “knowledge of the Good” is not simply theoretical knowledge, but also knowledge in the sense of “knowing how”: knowing how to achieve what’s good, to do what’s good, to accomplish what’s good. Mere “book knowledge” or simply being smart is not enough.
The Intelligible – Socrates uses “the intelligible” to name the aspects of the world that we can only grasp through thinking or insight. With my eyes I can see the tree outside my window, but what it means to be a tree is something I can only comprehend in thought. Likewise, I can see the people around me, but human nature, human dignity, and what it means to be human is something I can only grasp conceptually. “The intelligible” is the world insofar as it “makes sense” and can be comprehended.
The Visible – By “the visible,” Socrates means those aspects of the world we can perceive with our five senses and our imagination—those aspects of the world we can see, hear, taste, smell, touch, and imagine. For example, with my eyes I can see the sky, trees, people around me, and so on as visible things. “The visible” is the world insofar as it can be perceived and imagined.
Education – Socrates says that the allegorical story he tells represents the effect of education on human nature. “Education” here is a translation of the ancient Greek word “paideia,” which means “education” in the widest sense of the term. “Paideia” doesn’t mean “education” in the sense of going to school or getting good grades. Instead, it refers to the process of becoming a wise, intelligent, good, and well-rounded human being.
Allegory – An allegory is a symbolic narrative where characters, events, and/or settings represent abstract ideas or convey deeper meanings beyond the literal story. Socrates tells such a symbolic narrative in the passages below. The characters, events, and setting of his narrative symbolize the effect of what he calls “education.”
Self-knowledge – Knowledge of the contents of one’s own mind, such as one’s own beliefs and desires. Self-knowledge can be gained through introspection, that is, by reflecting on what one thinks and experiences. Some philosophers believe that self-knowledge has special properties that our knowledge of the external world lacks, such as being clearer, more reliable, or more valuable.
Dualism – The view that the mind is entirely distinct from the body. This view is usually contrasted with different kinds of monism, which hold that the mind is ultimately just a part of the body (materialism) or that the body is ultimately just a part of the mind (idealism). Dualists hold that the mind and the body are fundamentally different aspects of reality, and both categories are needed to properly describe the universe, especially the human person.
The Self – What the ‘I’ in ‘I am, I exist’ refers to; the part of you that really makes you you. Many philosophers have provided rich accounts of what the self ultimately is, including the soul, the mind, one special feature of the mind (such as consciousness), a mixture of all these elements, or perhaps a mere illusion.
The ‘Cogito’ – Descartes’ famous claim ‘I think, therefore I am’ is often referred to as the cogito. The name comes from the Latin rendering of this phrase, which is ‘cogito, ergo sum.’ Descartes held that one can always believe this proposition with certainty. We cannot doubt our own existence, so the cogito survives his exercise of intense doubt. The cogito appears several times in Descartes’ writings, and he often phrased it slightly differently each time. It appears in the Second Meditation as ‘I am, I exist.’
Certainty – When one believes something with certainty, one is maximally confident that it is true. A certainty is something that is beyond dispute or immune to doubt. Although this captures the basic idea, like many epistemological notions, clarifying precisely what the notion of certainty amounts to is an ongoing area of philosophical research.
Vice – A bad habit that we learn over time through instruction or instinct and that we develop through repetition. What makes the habit bad is that, once we have that habit, our tendency is to do the incorrect thing in certain types of situations. We may choose to do something entirely uncalled for in that situation, or we may act at the wrong time, in the wrong way, to the wrong degree, or with the wrong attitudes, or for the wrong reasons.
Relative Mean – The “Goldilocks amount” of some type of action or emotion. When you act in this way, according to Aristotle, you act exactly as is required under the current circumstances. This means that you do what is called for by the situation at hand, rather than doing something too extreme or not doing something extreme enough. You do something in the moderate amount (the mean amount) relative to the specific situation you are in when you need to act.
Excellence/Virtue – A good habit that we learn over time through instruction and repetition. What makes the habit good is that, once we have that habit, we have a strong tendency to do the right thing at the right time, in the right way, to the right degree, with the right attitudes, whenever we are confronted with a situation that we know calls us to exercise that habit.
Doxastic Voluntarism – the view that we have at least some control over what we believe.
Evidence – information that increases the probability that a claim is true.
Sufficient – enough of something for a particular purpose. Whether something is sufficient is context-dependent.
Solon – In the Histories of Herodotus, Solon visits Croesus, the king of Lydia. Even though Croesus shows Solon all of his wealth, Solon refuses to call him the happiest man who ever lived because he does not know how Croesus will die
Priam – According to Greek mythology, Priam was the final king of Troy during the Trojan War. Despite his wealth and political power, he was killed by Achilles’ son Neopotolemus during the Sack of Troy
Virtue – The consistent and reliable tendency to perform one’s function excellently. When a person has a certain virtue, like courage, they have spent time developing the habit, in this case reacting to danger well, using their human abilities. The virtues then make it possible for us to live a life of flourishing
Sardanapalus – An Assyrian king described by the historian Diodorus as living a life of extreme decadence. Sardanapalus indulged himself with food, alcohol, and many concubines, even going so far to say that physical gratification is the purpose of life. Chrysippus said that, on his tomb is inscribed the following: “Though knowing full well that thou art but mortal, indulge thy desire, find joy in thy feasts. Dead, thou shalt have no delight […] I have only what I have eaten, what wantonness I have committed, what joys I received through passion; but my many rich possessions are now utterly dissolved.”
Function – the characteristic activity of a given thing which makes it what it is. The function of a knife is cutting, while the function of a heart is to pump blood
Eudaimonia – Frequently translated as ‘happiness’, eudaimonia means the attainment of active human flourishing, and is the end Aristotle identifies as humanity’s highest final good
Final Good – A good that we pursue for its own sake. Common examples of final goods include happiness, knowledge, and friendship
Instrumental Good – A good that we pursue for the sake of some other good. A common example is money, as money allows us to purchase other kinds of goods
Anytus – an Athenian politician, war general, and one of the primary accusers behind Socrates’ prosecution. Anytus feared that Socrates would undermine the young Athenian democracy he had helped create and defend
Oracle of Delphi – the high priestess at the temple at Delphi, the oracle was one of the most sought after seers of the ancient world and was thought to relay messages from the god Apollo
Chaerephon – an ancient Greek from the city Sphettus, Chaerephon is remembered as a loyal friend of Socrates, also making an appearance in two other Platonic dialogues, the Charmides and the Gorgias
Meletus – A poet and citizen of Athens and one of Socrates’ accusers. Amongst other things, Meletus accused Socrates of corrupting the youth
Apollo – the ancient sacred site Delphi was dedicated to the god Apollo, an ancient Greek god and the god that Socrates refers to throughout the Apology
Virtue – a character trait, acquired through habitual practice, that enables one to act well. The virtues can also be thought of as excellences of human character, as they make it possible for us to live a life of flourishing. Examples of the virtues include courage, prudence, and justice
The Evil Demon Argument – Argues that we cannot hold any of our beliefs with certainty because we could be radically deceived by an evil demon. A classic argument given by Descartes for doubting the reliability of almost all of our beliefs
Philosophical Skepticism – The position that we do not know many things that we ordinarily take ourselves to know
A Posteriori Knowledge – Knowledge that can only be acquired through having particular, concrete experiences. Such knowledge can be gained simply through our everyday experiences, or through more complex means like controlled scientific experiments
A Priori Knowledge – Knowledge that can be gained without having any particular concrete experiences. Such knowledge is typically gained by rational insight or intuition
Cartesian Method of Doubt – A process employed by René Descartes of rejecting all beliefs that he had at least some reason to doubt in order to see if he had any beliefs that he could know with certainty
Revelation – Theological truths that have been made known by means of some religious text, testimony, authority, or experience, or the act or process in which such truths are made known.
Rationalism – The view that the only reliable means of coming to know truths about God is reason. As a result, what we might otherwise believe by means of faith ought to be disregarded or even rejected in favor of what we must believe by means of reason.
Fideism – The view that the only reliable means of coming to know truths about God is faith. As a result, what we might otherwise believe by means of reason ought to be disregarded or even rejected in favor of what we must believe by means of faith.
Faith – The act of accepting a proposition as true for which there is less than demonstrable evidence, which rises above mere opinion but falls short of logical or scientific demonstration. Faith can also refer to a particular religious tradition or the body of beliefs that are central to that religious tradition.
Virtue – a character trait, acquired through habitual practice, that enables one to act well. The virtues can also be thought of as excellences of human character, as they make it possible for us to live a life of flourishing. Examples of the virtues include courage, prudence, and justice
Socratic Ignorance – an awareness of one’s own ignorance, and the reason that Socrates was deemed wise by the Oracle of Delphi. A person who lacks Socratic Ignorance may believe they know many things they actually don’t, leading them to overestimate how well they understand the world
Apology – a formal defense of justification of an action or belief. A Christian apologist, for example, is someone who defends their faith and seeks to justify it through an appeal to reason.