Key Concept
God as God – The phrase “God as God” is basically a synonym for “God the subject.” In other words, it refers to God precisely in God’s status as an incomprehensible divine Other.
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What would it take to make you invincible? One answer might be that it takes an event that turns you into a superhero or a god. That seems a deeply implausible path. But what if there is another path to invincibility, one with skills we already have? In particular, the skills of critical thinking, dutiful action, and keeping an even temper.
The place to start is to think about what invincibility is. Literally, it’s that one cannot be defeated. Now if defeat and its harms come from being kept from goals and goods one desires, then valuing only those things under our control guarantees that we can never be defeated. We can strive to be people who do their best by others, to think carefully about things, and to maintain calm. It is in these habits that a person’s life is good, and it is in these things that, because these things are up to us, we can guarantee that we are never defeated. Here, we will consider the Stoic recipe for invulnerability in Epictetus’s Encheiridion.
Epictetus (c 55- c130 BC) was born a slave in Heiropolis (which is in modern-day Turkey). His name literally means ‘acquired,’ and he was later bought by the freedman Epaphroditus, the administrative assistant to emperor Nero. Epictetus was brought to Rome to serve as an assistant secretary, and to that end, he studied with the great Stoic philosopher, Musonius Rufus. In this training, Epictetus learned the core tenets of Stoic philosophy and developed a skill for argument. Epictetus was eventually freed, and he then taught philosophy in Rome until the emperor Domitian expelled philosophers from the city (in roughly 89 BC). Epictetus established a school on the western coast of Greece in the port city of Nicopolis. There, he taught many students the tenets of Stoicism.
One of Epictetus’s students, Lucius Flavius Arrinaus (Arrian) took careful notes on Epictetus’s lectures. Arrian later published the long-form version of those notes in eight books as the Discourses (only four books survive today), and he published the core ideas as the Encheiridion (or Handbook). You’ll be reading selections from the Encheiridion, composed in fifty-three sections; it is the landmark statement of Stoic ethics. If you are interested in the full version of the Discourses, you can find it here. And you can find a full version of the Encheiridion here.
The Fundamental Division – the division between things that are under our direct control and those that are not. The important lesson is to care only about the things we can control.
Externals – things that are not under our control but that are all-too-easily confused with things that should be important to us, like wealth, status, and pleasure. Too many people believe externals like these are necessary for the good life, and the Stoic path is to focus not on these things but rather what is up to us.
Duties – acts of service, obedience, and respect that we owe to each other. The duties we owe to each other depend on what kind of relationship we have.
Intellectualism – the philosophical view that our motivations and emotions are all judgments. The reason why you do something, your motivation, is because you believe it’s the right thing to do. The reason why you feel good or bad about something, an emotion, is because you believe that something good or bad happened to you.
Askeses – exercises of Stoic thought and practice that make the lessons and habits of Stoic philosophy second-nature for Stoic practitioners.
Progressors – those who are not yet expert Stoic practitioners, but who are also aware of the fact that they must change their lives in that direction. They are working on making progress.
Progressor’s Temptation – a unique temptation for those making progress in which pride impedes their further progress and leads to backsliding.
In this passage, Epictetus lays out the Fundamental Division for Stoic ethics. There are things that are up to us, and things that are not. You can control your judgments by critically examining the reasons you make them. You can control what you value by asking questions about what makes those things valuable. But you can’t control whether people like you or whether you were born to a different family. Those are things up to things beyond your control. And the key is to see that chasing after things that aren’t under our control or wishing those things different is a hopeless task.
Section 1
Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.
The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed, and you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you suppose that only to be your own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, then no one will ever compel you or restrain you. Further, you will find fault with no one or accuse no one. You will do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemies, and you not be harmed.
Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be carried, even with a slight tendency, towards the attainment of lesser things. Instead, you must entirely quit some things and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would both have these great things, along with power and riches, then you will not gain even the latter, because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are achieved.
Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, “You are but an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be.” And then examine it by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.
The Stoic ethical program is posited on the thought that we are defeated in life when we value in ways that are ignorant of how the world really works. We should wise up and be ready. Pleasures fade too easily, wealth doesn’t bring happiness, and pursuing either is a treadmill. And status rarely tracks merit more than it does self-promotion. And none of these things are under our control, but are whims of fate. What it is to be defeated by life is putting our hopes for meaning and happiness in those things and finding that they do not come when we need them, they are fleeting, and the pursuit of them turns us into things we despise. If we work, instead, on seeing through the illusions of these externals, we will develop the skills of self-control and virtue. And in so doing, we make ourselves invulnerable.
It’s too easy to imagine a Stoic being removed from the world. But Stoics participated in the lives around them. They had families, careers, public offices, and social obligations. The key for practicing Stoics was to honor the connections that they have with others, to appreciate the people and things in their lives, but in ways that are realistic about finite beings. We die, we change. The objective is to be ready.
Section 3
With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning from the most insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.
Stoic ethics requires that, for us to live well, we must see the world clearly, and we must constantly work to undo the illusions and desires our connections to others create. Love is natural and it is a connection we should cultivate, but it is something we should take on knowing full well what that relationship is about. How many love songs are about loving you forever? Too many, and they cannot be right. We all die, we move on, we disappoint each other. To love as a grownup, without illusion, is to accept those things and to nevertheless love. Stoic askeses are practices of reminding oneself of the realities of life that prepare Stoic practitioners for those events. The ancient Greek root of “askeses” is the same for “ascetic”, which has a similar meaning – one is in training for seeing life’s values from the perspective of eternity and so with a rational detachment. The Stoic practice is to start with small things, so with a cup one is fond of, and remind oneself that the cup will break. We know it would be unwise to love the cup as though it will last forever, and so it is with all things. Not only will the lover that expects eternal love be disappointed, but that lover will be overbearing and demanding when things are imperfect. They will be the parent who cannot let go of a child who has grown up, or the lover who jealously intrudes on their partner’s life beyond the relationship. Knowing human limits to love not only makes us invulnerable to the harms those limits can cause us when we come to them, but it makes us more responsible lovers.
Human beings are connected to others, and despite the fact that it seems like the Fundamental Division and the askeses prompt us to pull back from connection, we are actually obliged to live in light of our connections. What makes these relationships with others important is that they give meaning to our actions and give our lives direction – we owe our family members, friends, fellow citizens, and colleagues particular duties on the basis of those connections.
Section 30
Duties are universally measured by relations. Is anyone a father? If so, it is implied that the children should take care of him, submit to him in everything, patiently listen to his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Are you naturally entitled, then, to a good father? No, only to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, keep your own situation towards him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature. For another will not hurt you unless you please. You will then be hurt when you think you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will find, from the idea of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, the corresponding duties if you accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations.
Our connections to others determines our duties. A parent has the duty of care for children, a brother has a particular duty to his siblings, and a child has obligations of obedience to parents. And we have duties to our neighbors, too. The key with the notion of a duty is that the good we do is in trying to live up to those responsibilities. For example, a good father can tragically lose a child, a good citizen can fail to save the state from falling into tyranny, and a good general can lose a battle. The key is that the good of the agent is detachable from whether the act is successful or not. It is a matter of being a dutiful person. And those duties stay in place even when others do not reciprocate. So, a good brother is still properly brotherly even when his siblings are rude, and good citizens still look for justice in their state even if the state has treated them unjustly. Reason identifies our connections and our correlated duties to each other, and then we dispel the illusions of self-interest, hurt, greed, or ambition that blind us to what we are duty-bound to do for our fellows.
The Stoics held that our emotions are constituted by our judgments about what is good and what is bad. We feel anger when we feel a bad thing has been done to us and we wish to harm the perpetrator back. We feel grief when we feel we have lost a good thing we cannot live without.
Section 5
Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death that it is terrible. When therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never attribute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own principles. An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition upon others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself. Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on himself.
Because of their emphasis on intellectual judgments in understanding the emotions, the Stoics are intellectualists about emotions – our feelings are reflections of our judgments. So, to fix how we feel depends on fixing how we judge. When we see things correctly, then others cannot truly harm us. We can never lose an external we cannot live without. Anger, fear, and grief are emotions borne of incorrect judgments. The Stoic life has other positive emotions in the place of these negative emotions; in particular, placidity and joy. We are placid when we know we cannot be defeated in a good life, because we know we are the source of our own meaning and good. We feel joy when we see the world come together in the way we know that it must – as a rational whole, with connections between people that gives it all meaning.
The progressor, for the Stoics, is an intermediate between the wise person and the foolish person. Too many aspects of culture make us foolish in that we value things that make us worse and miserable. We believe nonsense, and we behave shamelessly when we’ve taken on these illusions. The wise person has seen through all that and lives a life of virtue, knowledge, and temperance. But there is a third, intermediate, class of people, namely, those who want to deprogram themselves of the illusions of materialist culture and status idolatry, but who still struggle with those false values. Progressors are still fragile, as they are not yet invulnerable. This is because they are still learning and growing their skills of self-possession.
Section 13
If you want to improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to external things. Don’t wish to be thought to know anything; and even if you appear to be somebody important to others, distrust yourself. For, it is difficult to both keep your faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature, and at the same time acquire external things. But while you are careful about the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.
So a Stoic progressor, even if they know that wealth is an illusion, will still wince with envy when their neighbor reveals a huge paycheck or when a colleague wins a prestigious award. Progressors must accustom themselves with the askeses to being passed over for honors and prepare for not making much money, because those things cannot be what they value if they are wise. Better to really be a good person or to be a useful member of society than to have acclaim for those things.
The progressor’s temptation is to fall in love with oneself for one’s philosophical progress and to expect others to acknowledge and honor it. Knowing a little philosophy tempts us to become philosophical know-it-alls. In fact, this temptation to be proud of one’s progress in philosophy is a good thing – one has become something better. The problem, of course, is that expecting others to acknowledge and appreciate it is putting oneself in the pursuit of externalsmindedly do so only because it will improve overall happiness:
Section 46
Never call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal among the unlearned about theorems, but act conformably to them. Thus, at an entertainment, don’t talk how persons ought to eat, but eat as you ought. For remember that in this manner Socrates also universally avoided all ostentation. And when persons came to him and desired to be recommended by him to philosophers, he took and recommended them, so well did he bear being overlooked. So that if ever any talk should happen among the unlearned concerning philosophic theorems, be you, for the most part, silent. For there is great danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if anyone tells you that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have begun your business. For sheep don’t throw up the grass to show the shepherds how much they have eaten; but, inwardly digesting their food, they outwardly produce wool and milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise not show theorems to the unlearned, but the actions produced by them after they have been digested.
Progressors should remember that they didn’t get into philosophy for the status or the honor, so they should not expect those things for their philosophical progress. Progressors should see how far they have to go to wisdom than celebrate how far they have come from their previous errors (and the errors others are making now). It is also an error to be a philosophical show-off, to be the erudite professor, to name-drop hoping to impress. But those pursuing wisdom aren’t about those things, and caring about the truth and what’s right means one forgets oneself in an important way. Those pursuing wisdom pay attention only to how they need to and can improve. The problem, of course, is that progressors, because they are not yet wise, become distracted by themselves.
Epictetus’s Encheiridion is a recipe for invincibility. One takes up only challenges one can win. In particular, challenges over oneself and one’s mind. You cannot defeat fate, you cannot control the weather or the stock market, and you cannot make others respect and love you. But you can value doing right by those who depend on you. You can resolve to see through the illusions of value in a world of nonsense. You can find peace in victories over your worst self.
Section 19
You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own control to conquer. When, therefore, you see anyone eminent in honors, or power, or in high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be hurried away with the appearance, and to pronounce him happy; for, if the essence of good consists in things in our own control, there will be no room for envy or emulation. But, for your part, don’t wish to be a general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is a contempt of things not in our own control.
A longstanding worry with Stoicism, and the program in Epictetus’s Encheiridion in particular, is whether anyone could ever live up to these aspirations. And if one did live up to them, whether one would still be a human being. Consider the exercise of the cups (and then one’s child) from earlier. Yes, preparing to let go of fragile teacups and keeping things in perspective when they break is wise, but aren’t there losses and injustices people suffer that demand our grief and anger? To lose one’s child and not feel profound sadness? To face a scathing injustice and not feel righteous anger? Surely to not feel anger or sadness here would be a perversion of our humanity. And it’s highly unlikely that anyone could ever really do that, anyway!
Call these the practicability and the ruin problems for Stoicism. The practicability problem is that it doesn’t seem that anyone could consistently be a Stoic, and the ruin problem is that even if anyone could be a complete Stoic, it would be worse for them than better. To the practicability problem, the Stoics reply that the program is an aspiration. We hold out an exceedingly high standard for ourselves. We are perfectionists with our improvement, but at the same time recognize that we will all fail in some way. But we do better than we would have had we set the standard lower.
To the ruin problem, the Stoic reply is that grief and anger are not necessary to care for things that are valuable or stand for justice. One can do one’s duty without those passions. In fact, those passions of anger and grief stand in the way of a proper human life. Grief consumes us in a way that makes us forget our other connections and duties, and anger burns through our minds so that vendetta is too easily confused with justice. To the contrary, then, Stoics like Epictetus held that grief and anger make us less human. The practice of freeing ourselves from them makes us free to be better people.
With the Encheiridion, we have the most succinct and clear statement of Stoic philosophy. It is a handbook of virtue, duty, critical thinking, and placidity. And in these things, it is a recipe for invulnerability. By Epictetus’s lights, this is a happy life, because virtue enacted in this fashion is sufficient for happiness.
For a complete picture of what the Stoics held was the good life, read the full version of Epictetus’s Encheiridion, and then the remaining four books of the Discourses. For more about Stoic ethics and Epictetus’s place in the story of that school, see Scott Aikin and William Stephens’s book, Epictetus’s Encheiridion: A New Translation and Guide to Stoic Ethics.
All quotations from the Encheiridion are from the translation by Elizabeth Carter, available here. This work in the public domain. All images were created using Midjourney and are the property of the Philosophy Teaching Library.
Aikin, Scott. 2024. “Stoic Life, Perfection, and Invincibility: Epictetus’s Encheiridion.” The Philosophy Teaching Library. Edited by Robert Weston Siscoe, <https://philolibrary.crc.nd.edu/article/stoic-invincibility>.
God as God – The phrase “God as God” is basically a synonym for “God the subject.” In other words, it refers to God precisely in God’s status as an incomprehensible divine Other.
Incarnation – The Christian doctrine of the incarnation is the notion that the word of God became fully human in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It is closely associated with the doctrine of the trinity, which asserts that God the Father, God the Son (Jesus as the word made flesh), and God the Holy Spirit are one God.
Religious Fanaticism – In Feuerbach’s use of the term, a religious fanatic is someone who is unwaveringly faithful to God as an utterly mysterious superhuman being. They subordinate other things—especially the love of other humans—to submission before this divine other.
God the Subject – When Feuerbach refers to God as a subject, he is referring to the commonplace religious belief that God is a being who has various attributes, like a loving nature.
Faith Separates Man From God – Faith separates God from man in this sense: it treats God as a mysterious other, a being radically distinct from us.
Faith – Belief in and fidelity to a transcendent divine subject like God.
Orthodoxy – Orthodoxy refers to “right belief,” and it is concern with identifying heresies and ensuring that people believe and practice correctly.
Indirect Form of Self-Knowledge – Feuerbach’s view is that religious belief is a naive way of relating to our human nature and its perfections. It is naive or childlike because it treats these as external realities that belong to God. He believes a mature and contemplative person realizes these don’t belong to God, but rather to our species, abstractly conceived.
Above the Individual Man – The human perfections are “above the individual” insofar as no particular individual ever perfectly realizes them. They are abstractions.
Divine Trinity – Feuerbach is having fun here. He is using the theological phrasing of the Trinity to talk about human perfections. In calling reason, love, and freedom of the will “divine,” he means they are absolutely good; they are activities whose goodness is intrinsic to their practice or exercise. This isn’t a novel philosophical view. For example, Immanuel Kant argued that autonomy or a good will is the only thing which is unconditionally good.
Perfections – The end to which a faculty or power is ordered. For example, omniscience would be the perfection of the intellect. Traditionally, God is said to possess all perfections.
Love – When Feuerbach writes about love, he is referring to unconditional concern for others and the desire for fellowship with them. He is here asserting that love, understood in this sense, is the perfect activity of the affective faculty. In other words, our feelings and passions are fully actualized and engaged in an intrinsically valuable activity when we genuinely love others.
Infinite – The infinite is whatever can be understood as unbounded or unlimited. Human nature in the abstract is unbounded and unlimited. It is only bounded or limited in its concrete form as it is realized by particular material individuals.
Higher Consciousness – The sort of consciousness that mature human beings possess, but which other animals do not. It is “higher” than animal consciousness because it involves thinking abstractly about the form or essence of things.
Science – Feuerbach uses the term science in its classical sense, meaning systematically organized knowledge. Any body of knowledge founded on an understanding of first principles and the essences of things is a science in this sense.
Popular Sovereignty – The view that a government’s authority to rule comes from the people, making a ruler subject to the will of their citizens.
The Divine Right of Kings – The theory that kings are chosen by God and thus that political revolt is a rebellion against the will of God.
Synthesis – The prefix ‘syn-’ means “together,” so a synthesis “brings together” or combines elements of both a thesis and its antithesis.
Antithesis– An antithesis is the contradiction of a thesis. For example, internationalism could be understood as the antithesis of nationalism.
Thesis – In Hegelian terms, a thesis can be understood as a position or theory. Examples include any of the “-isms” that we discuss in science, history, and philosophy, such as Darwinism, capitalism, nationalism, etc.
Progressor’s Temptation – a unique temptation for those making progress in which pride impedes their further progress and leads to backsliding.
Progressors – those who are not yet expert Stoic practitioners, but who are also aware of the fact that they must change their lives in that direction. They are working on making progress.
Intellectualism – the philosophical view that our motivations and emotions are all judgments. The reason why you do something, your motivation, is because you believe it’s the right thing to do. The reason why you feel good or bad about something, an emotion, is because you believe that something good or bad happened to you.
Duties – acts of service, obedience, and respect that we owe to each other. The duties we owe to each other depend on what kind of relationship we have.
Askeses – exercises of Stoic thought and practice that make the lessons and habits of Stoic philosophy second-nature for Stoic practitioners.
Externals – things that are not under our control but that are all-too-easily confused with things that should be important to us, like wealth, status, and pleasure. Too many people believe externals like these are necessary for the good life, and the Stoic path is to focus not on these things but rather what is up to us.
The Fundamental Division – the division between things that are under our direct control and those that are not. The important lesson is to care only about the things we can control.
The Greatest Happiness Principle – A principle which says that actions are right insofar as they promote happiness and wrong insofar as they promote unhappiness
Higher and Lower Pleasures – Types of pleasures that differ in terms of their quality. Things like food and drugs create lower pleasures. Things like intellectual pursuits and doing the right thing create higher forms of pleasure.
The Doctrine of Swine – An objection that utilitarianism entails that if people would be happy rolling in mud, that’s what would be morally best for them to do, so we should reject the theory.
Utilitarianism – A normative theory of which actions are right or wrong. Utilitarianism says the right action is that which maximises utility.
Jeremy Bentham – Considered by some as the father of utilitarianism, Bentham was a moral philosopher and one of John Stuart Mill’s teachers