Governments all around the world call themselves ‘republics’. Primary and secondary schools in 47 US states require students to recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag and republic of the United States of America. The official name of China is the People’s Republic of China. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan borders the Republic of India. In fact, according to the UN, of the 195 countries in the world, 159 use the word ‘republic’ in their name.
Well, what is a republic? It’s from a Latin word, res publica, and, in its broadest sense, can be translated as ‘the people’s thing’ and meant something like the similarly vague English word ‘commonwealth’. How did this Latin word make its way into the official names of 159 countries? The thought and influence of the ancient Roman philosopher and statesperson Cicero is an important part of that story.
Before reading the rest of this commentary, you can learn a few basics about Cicero and his political philosophy here:
Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman politician, philosopher, humanist, champion of republicanism, was born in 106 BCE and died by assassination in 43 BCE. He became an influential senator and consul (chief executive), andis the most influential prose writer in the history of the Latin language. He was in many senses the first Roman philosopher, essentially inventing Latin philosophical vocabulary through his engagement with Greek philosophy. (Essence, quality, quantity, perception, probability, and humanity – to name a few – were Latin words coined by him!)
Cicero lived during the tumultuous end of the Roman Republic which saw protracted civil wars. Various strongmen generals vied for ultimate power in the Roman Republic in this period (c. 133 BCE – 44 BCE). Cicero faced a conspiratorial plot in his own consulship (63 BCE) from a disaffected politician, Catiline, and secured extrajudicial executions of Catiline and the other plotters, complicating his legacy as constitutional defender.
Cicero witnessed the rise of popular statesperson and general Julius Caesar, the first declared dictator perpetuo ‘dictator forever’ whose adopted son Octavian (later Caesar Augustus) eventually initiated the Roman imperial system under his sole authority after Julius Caesar’s assassination. Cicero vigorously resisted these authoritarian developments openly and in private letters, continuously advocating for the traditional Roman republican form of government in which power is shared between ‘the senate and the people of Rome’.
Cicero’s advocacy for a return to traditional republican government was among the most dynamic among any political leader at the end of the Roman Republic. His blistering speeches delivered against one of the strongmen of this era, Mark Antony, resulted in his murder and decapitation by sword-wielding assassins.
Cicero was highly educated. Living a few hundred years after Socrates, in his youth Cicero studied with leading Greek philosophers of his time in Athens. Cicero claimed his philosophical allegiance to the ‘New Academy’, a school of thinkers who claimed to be the rightful heirs to Plato’s teaching in his own Academy. These thinkers were skeptics about human beings’ ability to have certain knowledge about philosophical questions. However, Cicero was influenced by Academic skeptics who felt that even though we couldn’t secure certain knowledge owing to human propensity to errors in judgement, we could nevertheless achieve plausible/persuasive (probabilis) knowledge through study, experience, and philosophical reflection.
Cicero wrote voluminously. In addition to speeches, letters, poems, and rhetorical treatises, Cicero composed numerous philosophical works, many taking the form of dialogues similar to Plato’s. The De republica (lit. On the Republic) was Cicero’s best-known work in antiquity. It survived in its entirety until the 5th or 6th century CE but unfortunately comes to us today in a fragmented state. It was evidently composed as a sort of Roman version of Plato’s Politeia (translated Republic in English) and across six books it covered, according to Cicero, “the nature of the best state and the best citizen” (Cic. Ad.Q.fr. 3.5-6).
In this commentary, we will explore the first book of Cicero’s Republic, where Cicero crafted a philosophical dialogue that engages with the theory of the superiority of the ‘mixed constitution’ (perfected, Cicero’s main character thinks, in the Roman constitution) as a form of government. The dialogue takes place in 129 BCE among Romans Cicero himself looked up to. The main characters are Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (a famous Roman statesperson and general) and Gaius Laelius, his best friend and main philosophical interlocutor. The text we have can be found here.
Republic (res publica) – Cicero’s short definition of res publica is res populi (the ‘people’s thing’). Later in the Republic, Cicero famously defines a republic (1.39) as a multitude of people associated with each other by consensus on justice (ius) and mutual benefit (utilitas).
Monarchy – A monarchy is a state where political deliberation is performed by one person (generally a king or queen).
Aristocracy – An aristocracy is a state where political deliberation is shared among a group of select individuals.
Democracy – A democracy is a state where political deliberation is shared among the entire people of the state.
Mixed Constitution – A mixed constitution combines elements of all three ‘simple’ forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy), dividing political deliberation among all three in its official governmental structure. For example, in the traditional Roman republican constitution, political power was divided between the people (in the assemblies and tribunate), the aristocracy (in the senate), and chief executives who ruled for one year (the two consuls).
Cicero, as a statesperson well-versed in philosophy, wanted to encourage intellectuals to participate in political life. He was concerned that virtuous people who had developed both intellectual and moral virtues might not engage in politics out of fear. He begins On the Republic with an impassioned defense of the active life (vita activa). He also describes his own motivations for staying involved in politics even at great risk to his personal safety.
Book 1, 2-12
But it is not enough to possess virtue, as if it were an art of some sort, unless you make use of it. Though it is true that an art, even if you never use it, can still remain in your possession by the very fact of your knowledge of it, yet the existence of virtue depends entirely upon its use, and its noblest use is the government of the State, and the realisation in fact, not in words […]
For such was my nature that, although, on account of the manifold pleasures I found in the studies which had engaged me from boyhood, it would have been possible for me, on the one hand, to reap greater profit from a quiet life than other men, or, on the other hand, if any disaster should happen to us all, to suffer no more than my fair share of the common misfortune, yet I could not hesitate to expose myself to the severest storms, and, I might almost say, even to thunderbolts, for the sake of the safety of my fellow-citizens, and to secure, at the cost of my own personal danger, a quiet life for all the rest. For, in truth, our country has not given us birth and education without expecting to receive some sustenance, as it were, from us in return; nor has it been merely to serve our convenience that she has granted to our leisure a safe refuge and for our moments of repose a calm retreat; on the contrary, she has given us these advantages so that she may appropriate to her own use the greater and more important part of our courage, our talents, and our wisdom, leaving to us for our own private uses only so much as may be left after her needs have been satisfied.
I have treated these matters at considerable length because I have planned and undertaken in this work a discussion of the State; hence, in order that this discussion might not be valueless, I had, in the first place, to remove all grounds for hesitation about taking part in public affairs […] For there is really no other occupation in which human virtue approaches more closely the august function of the gods than that of founding new States or preserving those already in existence.
When Socrates was awaiting execution after his trial in Athens in 399 BCE, several of his friends planned his escape from prison to avoid his death sentence. In the Crito, Socrates explains his reasoning for refusing this request, arguing that we owe our homeland obedience to its laws in return for the benefits of our lives and education we have enjoyed from the state. Here, Cicero suggests that we owe our country our service and political participation in return for the benefits it offers us. Other ancient philosophers, such as the Epicureans (whom Cicero is arguing against here), argued that political participation puts undue risks on individuals and distracts people from the genuine pleasures of a simple life. Is it justifiable to remove oneself from political obligations and expectations? Why or why not?
After an introductory discussion among the dialogue participants surrounding current political and astronomical events in Rome (Cicero, like many ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, may have thought there was a connection between such events!), Gaius Laelius asks Scipio Aemilianus Africanus to discuss the best form of government, especially as Scipio is well-versed in both politics and philosophy.
Book 1, 35-39
Scipio: […] Therefore I ask you to listen to me as to one who is neither entirely ignorant of the Greek authorities, nor, on the other hand, prefers their views, particularly on this subject, to our own, but rather as to a Roman who, though provided by a father’s care with a liberal education and eager for knowledge from boyhood, yet has been trained by experience and the maxims learned at home much more than by books.
Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people . But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good. The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social spirit which nature has implanted in man. For man is not a solitary or unsocial creature, but born with such a nature that not even under conditions of great prosperity of every sort [is he willing to be isolated from his fellow men] .
Here Scipio defines res publica. Sometimes Scipio uses res publica to mean a state in general, in others he means to describe a particular kind of state, namely the Roman form of government. First, Scipio says that a republic is ‘the property of the people’. Then, he says that a republic isn’t just any sort of state. Rather, it’s one where people have gathered around common agreement about justice and mutual benefits. Next, Scipio says that human beings join together in such common associations because of their nature as social beings (not because of their inherent weaknesses). In this way, Cicero seems to be more hopeful about human nature than other philosophers.
Here, Cicero’s Scipio says that human beings naturally associate in groups, ideally around shared conceptions of justice and the mutual benefits possible in communities. Mengzi, an ancient Confucian philosopher, argues that human beings’ natures are good and that human beings naturally show compassion and benevolence to one another. This, in turn, influences how Mengzi thinks enlightened kings should rule—by virtues like compassion and humanity. Xunzi, an ancient Confucian philosopher of a very different worldview (sometimes compared to the early modern philosophers Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes), thought that human beings were by nature bad and required external laws, rituals, and authority to help them counter their evil, selfish natures. Which of these thinkers do you agree with? How do these beliefs impact how we think human beings should govern themselves?
Scipio begins his discussion of the three simple forms of government by saying that every assemblage of people needs “deliberation” or a “deliberative body” (consilium) if it is going to persist in time. He proposes that there are three basic ways a group of people might govern themselves: one ruler, rule by a deliberative council of citizens, or rule by the people themselves. These are three different ways in which political deliberation (consilium) can be achieved in a community.
Book 1, 41-44
[…] Therefore every people, which is such a gathering of large numbers as I have described, every city, which is an orderly settlement of a people, every commonwealth, which, as I said, is “the property of a people,” must be governed by some deliberative body if it is to be permanent. And this deliberative body must, in the first place, always owe its beginning to the same cause as that which produced the State itself. In the second place, this function must either be granted to one man, or to certain selected citizens, or must be assumed by the whole body of citizens. And so when the supreme authority is in the hands of one man, we call him a king, and the form of this State a kingship. When selected citizens hold this power, we say that the State is ruled by an aristocracy. But a popular government (for so it is called) exists when all the power is in the hands of the people. And any one of these three forms of government (if only the bond which originally joined the citizens together in the partnership of the State holds fast), though not perfect or in my opinion the best, is tolerable, though one of them may be superior to another. For either a just and wise king, or a select number of leading citizens, or even the people itself, though this is the least commendable type, can nevertheless, as it seems, form a government that is not unstable, provided that no elements of injustice or greed are mingled with it […]
I am now speaking of these three forms of government, not when they are confused and mingled with one another, but when they retain their appropriate character. All of them are, in the first place, subject each to the faults I have mentioned, and they suffer from other dangerous faults in addition for before every one of them lies a slippery and precipitous path leading to a certain depraved form that is a close neighbour to it. For underneath the tolerable, or, if you like, the lovable King Cyrus (to cite him as a pre-eminent example) lies the utterly cruel Phalaris, impelling him to an arbitrary change of character; for the absolute rule of one man will easily and quickly degenerate into a tyranny like his. And a close neighbour to the excellent Massilian government, conducted by a few leading citizens, is such a partisan combination of thirty men as once ruled Athens. And as for the absolute power of the Athenian people – not to seek other examples of popular government – when it changed into the fury and licence of a mob […]
Cicero’s Scipio has us imagine how human beings would lead themselves whenever they assemble in large groups. He thinks leadership is essential to maintain the permanence of this group over time. He proposes three options: leadership of one individual (monarchy), leadership of a group of individuals (aristocracy), and leadership of the group itself (democracy). He thinks these different leadership arrangements would help the political community determine its form of “political deliberation” for making decisions.
Imagine, as Scipio asks us, a large group of human beings (a multitude, he says—probably at least a few thousand). How could such a group of human beings determine their political leadership? What are the different possibilities? List them. Group them. Is the list Scipio offers here—the three ‘basic’ forms—exhaustive? What other ways could human beings determine their form of political deliberation?
Scipio starts his discussion of the three basic forms of government with democracy—rule by the people.
Book 1, 47-49
Scipio: […] and every State is such as its ruler’s character and will make it. Hence liberty has no dwelling-place in any State except that in which the people’s power is the greatest, and surely nothing can be sweeter than liberty; but if it is not the same for all, it does not deserve the name of liberty. And how can it be the same for all, I will not say in a kingdom, where there is no obscurity or doubt about the slavery of the subject, but even in States where everyone is ostensibly free? I mean States in which the people vote, elect commanders and officials, are canvassed for their votes, and have bills proposed to them, but really grant only what they would have to grant even if they were unwilling to do so, and are asked to give to others what they do not possess themselves. For they have no share in the governing power, in the deliberative function, or in the courts, over which selected judges preside, for those privileges are granted on the basis of birth or wealth. But in a free nation, such as the Rhodians or the Athenians, there is not one of the citizens who [may not hold the offices of State and take an active part in the government ] […]
Therefore, since law is the bond which unites the civic association, and the justice enforced by law is the same for all, by what justice can an association of citizens be held together when there is no equality among the citizens? For if we cannot agree to equalise men’s wealth, and equality of innate ability is impossible, the legal rights at least of those who are citizens of the same commonwealth ought to be equal. For what is a State except an association or partnership in justice?
Here, Scipio rehearses common ancient arguments of advocates for democracy. In the Ancient Mediterranean, especially the Greek-speaking world, democracies could be found in several city-states. Athens’s democracy is the most famous of these. The Roman constitution, too, had democratic elements in its popular assemblies and the role of the tribune. In Athens, all free male citizens wielded some political power.
However, there is a deep tension. In the Ancient Mediterranean, the practice of chattel slavery (ownership of another human being as property) was widespread and rarely challenged. In fact, the enslaved population of the Roman Empire is estimated to have been as high as 30 percent of the total population. Enslaved people were under the complete control of their enslavers. Further, the status of women in ancient Rome was highly precarious as well, as most Roman women were under the legal authority of the paterfamilias (head of household), who possessed power over all members of the household (including children, women, and enslaved people) up to and including administering the death penalty.
This raises an important question. How much should we trust ancient political theory about democracy—or about good government generally—from authors who partook as masters in the ancient practice of slavery and systematically treated women as property of the family? Nearly all ancient philosophers we read today were wealthy men and owned other people as slaves. Cicero certainly did. Puzzling to us, there was widespread acceptance of slavery even among ‘cosmopolitan’ philosophers like the Stoics and even early Christians.
An objector might claim that this fundamental contradiction—that ancient authors put forward arguments for political freedom for some while condoning enslavement of large portions of the population—should make us wary of, and question the value of, the political philosophy of ancient Greek and Roman authors.
Charles Mills, a contemporary philosopher, used to say in his classes that when engaging with historical figures’ philosophical views, we could either adopt, adapt, or reject the thinkers’ views. Which do you think is the best way to engage with ancient philosophy, keeping in mind what we know about the systematic social inequalities we see in these societies? Should philosophers’ partaking in social injustice affect how we view and engage with their philosophical thought?
Here, Scipio repeats arguments some philosophers have put forward for the superiority of rule by an aristocracy. We then hear from Scipio what others have said in favor of monarchy. Last, we learn about the supposed superiority of the mixed constitution. As you read, note what you think are strengths and weaknesses of the arguments put forward! First, Scipio considers the virtues of aristocracies.
Book 1, 51
Scipio: […] But what can be nobler than the government of the State by virtue? For then the man who rules others is not himself a slave to any passion, but has already acquired for himself all those qualities to which he is training and summoning his fellows. Such a man imposes no laws upon the people that he does not obey himself, but puts his own life before his fellow-citizens as their law. If a single individual of this character could order all things properly in a State, there would be no need of more than one ruler, or if the citizens as a body could see what was best and agree upon it, no one would desire a selected group of rulers. It has been the difficulty of formulating policies that has transferred the power from a king to a larger number; and the perversity and rashness of popular assemblies that have transferred it from the many to the few. Thus, between the weakness of a single ruler and the rashness of the many, aristocracies have occupied that intermediate position which represents the utmost moderation, and in a State ruled by its best men, the citizens must necessarily enjoy the greatest happiness, being freed from all cares and worries, when once they have entrusted the preservation of their tranquillity to others, whose duty it is to guard it vigilantly and never to allow the people to think that their interests are being neglected by their rulers […]
He then turns to potential benefits of a monarchy.
Book 1, 54-55
Laelius: But what about yourself, Scipio? Which of these three forms do you consider the best?
Scipio: You are right to ask which I consider the best of the three, for I do not approve of any of them when employed by itself, and consider the form which is a combination of all them superior to any single one of them. But if I were compelled to approve one single unmixed form, [I might choose] the kingship […] the name of king seems like that of father to us, since the king provides for the citizens as if they were his own children, and is more eager to protect them than […] to be sustained by the care of one man who is the most virtuous and most eminent. But here are the aristocrats, with the claim that they can do this more effectively, and that there will be more wisdom in the counsels of several than in those of one man, and an equal amount of fairness and scrupulousness. And here also are the people, shouting with a loud voice that they are willing to obey neither one nor a few, that nothing is sweeter than liberty even to wild beasts, and that all who are slaves, whether to a king or to an aristocracy, are deprived of liberty. Thus kings attract us by our affection for them, aristocracies by their wisdom, and popular governments by then freedom, so that in comparing them it is difficult to say which one prefers.
Before finally settling on the superiority of a mixed constitution.
Book 1, 69-70
Scipio: […] Since this is true, the kingship, in my opinion, is by far the best of the three primary forms, but a moderate and balanced form of government which is a combination of the three good simple forms is preferable even to the kingship. For there should be a supreme and royal element in the State, some power also ought to be granted to the leading citizens, and certain matters should be left to the judgment and desires of the masses. Such a constitution, in the first place, offers in a high degree a sort of equality, which is a thing free men can hardly do without for any considerable length of time, and, secondly, it has stability. For the primary forms already mentioned degenerate easily into the corresponding perverted forms, the king being replaced by a despot, the aristocracy by an oligarchical faction, and the people by a mob and anarchy, but whereas these forms are frequently changed into new ones, this does not usually happen in the case of the mixed and evenly balanced constitution, except through great faults in the governing class. For there is no reason for a change when every citizen is firmly established in his own station, and there underlies it no perverted form into which it can plunge and sink.
But I am afraid that you, Laelius, and you, my very dear and learned friends, may think, if I spend more time upon this aspect of the subject, that my discourse is rather that of a master or teacher than of one who is merely considering these matters in company with yourselves. Therefore I will pass to a topic which is familiar to everyone, and which we ourselves discussed some time ago. For I am convinced, I believe, and I declare that no other form of government is comparable, either in its general character, in its distribution of powers, or in the training it gives, with that which our ancestors received from their own forefathers, and have handed down to us […]
Cicero’s Scipio concludes that the best form of government is the so-called “Mixed Constitution.” Further, Scipio goes on to make a case for the ancient Roman constitution’s being an exemplary form of the mixed constitution in On the Republic, Book 2. The theory of the mixed constitution has its roots in Plato (both the Republic and Laws) and Aristotle (Politics), though it found its most famous treatment in Polybius’s Histories, Book 6. Polybius was a contemporary (and even companion) of Scipio Aemilianus and was a deep influence on Cicero. Cicero and Polybius were, in turn, great influences on the Renaissance and European Enlightenment, and the U.S. system of “checks and balances” and distributed power between executive, legislative, and judicial branches were explicitly conceived as mixed government elements by the American Framers (see, for example, Federalist Papers 40 and 63).
We can see that this idea has been very influential. But is it right? What evidence points to the mixed constitution being the best form of government? Does it really succeed in distributing power fairly among the classes of society?
In this commentary, we have seen how Cicero’s characters in On the Republic, especially Scipio Aemilianus and Gaius Laelius, conceive of the governmental structure of a res publica and how, ideally, it possesses a balance among the powers of its classes for a shared constitution and a mixed form of government. We learned that this theory has been deeply influential throughout history and informs the ways actual governments are arranged all around the world (to greater and lesser degrees!). We have also considered deep questions about whether Cicero’s Scipio is right in advancing that the Roman republic is an ideal form of government when freedom was denied to any person who is enslaved or non-male in the ancient Roman republican constitution.
We started this essay wondering about the meaning of the very word “republic”. Cicero’s Scipio thinks a true republic is one that has a mixed constitution because this allows a large group of people to associate with one another in a shared conception of justice and for mutual benefit. The USA and the UK are sometimes offered as examples of stable and successful mixed constitutions. Do you agree? What evidence could you put forward to defend your claim?
Read more about Cicero’s political philosophy at the link below for all fragments of Cicero’s On the Republic. Further, you could then read the companion dialogue to On the Republic, Cicero’s On the Laws. If you want to learn more about the influences behind Cicero’s thinking, see Plato’s own Republic and Laws and Aristotle’s Politics. If you want to see how Cicero influenced the American Founders, read the Federalist Papers (especially 40 and 63). Last, if you are interested in the comparative philosophy we introduced in this article, read the Mengzi and the Xunzi for two different views of human nature and how we ought to govern ourselves.
To further reinforce your learning from this article, watch this video from Kyle Harper, professor of classics at the University of Oklahoma. In it, Professor Harper delves deeper into Cicero’s thinking and provides additional context from Roman history to deepen your understanding.
After viewing, reflect: What does this thinking all mean for you? What government do you want to see in the world? How might it bring about justice and flourishing for all people? What virtues might you need to develop to engage in politics actively as Cicero recommends to us at the beginning of On the Republic?
This commentary uses C.W. Keyes’s 1928 translation of Cicero’s On the Republic 1, commissioned by the Loeb Classical Library, now in the public domain. “Memorial Hall, Harvard University” by Akash Puthraya is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons. This image has been cropped. “Harvard University Memorial Hall” by Daderot is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons. This image has been cropped. “Memorial Hall Facade, Harvard” by Daderot is licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. Source: Wikimedia Commons. The bust of Cicero image was created using Midjourney and is inspired by the bust of Cicero on Harvard’s Memorial Hall. The author would like to thank Ashley (Yuqi) Zheng for her recommending using the bust of Cicero on Memorial Hall as part of the artwork for this piece.
Dutmer, Evan. 2025. “The People’s Property and the Common Good: Cicero’s On the Republic, Book 1.” The Philosophy Teaching Library. Edited by Robert Weston Siscoe, <https://philolibrary.crc.nd.edu/article/the-peoples-property/>.
Monarchy – A monarchy is a state where political deliberation is performed by one person (generally a king or queen).
Phalaris (c. 570-549 BCE) was, by most accounts, the very opposite of Cyrus, and he was used as an example of tyrannical cruelty in antiquity. He was tyrant of Acragas (now Agrigento) in Sicily. Diodorus Siculus records an infamous account of Phalaris’s torturing his enemies in a bronze bull placed over a roaring fire.
Cyrus the Great (d. 530 BCE) was the first emperor of the Persian Empire and a commonly used exemplar of the “enlightened monarch” in antiquity. He was renowned for his tolerance and care for his subjects. Xenophon, a student of Socrates, wrote a partly fictionalized biography of Cyrus called The Education of Cyrus (Cyropaedia). Peter Drucker, an influential 20th-century management theorist, called the Cyropaedia the best book on leadership.
Republic (res publica) – Cicero’s short definition of res publica is res populi (the ‘people’s thing’). Later in the Republic, Cicero famously defines a republic (1.39) as an assemblage of people associated with each other by consensus on justice (ius) and mutual benefit (utilitas).
Scipio Aemilianus Africanus was a hero among many Romans, but his reputation today is far less straightforward. Scipio Aemilianus led a Roman military campaign resulting in the utter destruction of the city of Carthage in 146 BCE. The Carthaginians were a prosperous Phoenician people in North Africa and rivals to Roman power. It has been argued that this act of ‘national extermination’ meets the modern definition of genocide. How should this knowledge impact how we view Scipio’s political philosophy expressed here?
This famous phrase, known by the abbreviation SPQR (senatus populusque Romanus), served as something like the official title of the Roman state (compare ‘USA’, ‘USSR’, ‘UK’), and encapsulated the ideal of a res publica (common property in public hands shared between the people and a council of elders).
Contemplation: The activity of human beings’ rationality. Contemplation is more than just thinking; it’s thinking excellently about ultimate truths. Contemplation is the ultimate activity associated with human flourishing.
Eudaimonia: Often translated as ‘happiness’ (in this text) or ‘flourishing’, eudaimonia is the activity of living the best possible life for a human being. Eudaimonia is more than just feeling happy or contented – it’s the idea that there is a best way to live for human beings.
Virtue: Virtues are cultivated tendencies to perform our function excellently, which allow us to reliably do the right thing, to the right extent, for the right reasons, given the demands of a specific circumstance. There are three components of virtues: virtues involve (a) skillful activity – they’re excellences after all!, (b) proper motivation, and (c) appropriate judgment – they often lead to judgments about what is the right thing to do, which requires careful attention to the circumstances.
Pleasure: The enjoyable feeling that accompanies some activities. Some philosophers (but not Aristotle!) think that pleasure is the only thing that is good in itself
Endoxic Method: An argumentative structure that begins by laying out the endoxa, or the beliefs of the many or the wise, then raises apparent problems for those views and develops a resolution to those problems.
The Problem of Induction: A problem for reasoning about the future based on past experiences. How can we be justified in believing that patterns of events in the past will continue into the future?
A Priori: Hume is using the term ‘a priori’ to denote the kind of reasoning that allows one to gain knowledge as relations of ideas—in other words, reasoning from one necessary, definitional truth to another.
Justification: the concept of justifying one’s thinking, or one’s beliefs, is important in epistemology. Roughly, one’s thinking or belief is justified when there is good reason for it, or when it is well supported or well evidenced. All of these are ways of referring to some connection between what we think or believe and what is, or to some way of at least making ourselves think that we are closer to the truth.
Inference: The psychological process of moving from one thought to another, such as moving from the thought “it’s raining, and I don’t want to get wet” to “I should get my umbrella”, or from “I am tired, and it’s getting late” to “I should get some sleep”. Nowadays, philosophers tend to use the term ‘inference’ to mean the same as ‘reasoning’, and tend instead to use the term ‘association’ to refer to movements between thoughts that are not based on any logic or evidence.
Matters of Fact: Knowledge that is gained by experience, such as by observing or experimenting with objects in the world. For example, knowing whether all swans in the world are white requires somebody to examine the many swans in the world and make sure they do not happen to discover a black one (and in fact, there are black swans!).
Relations of Ideas: Knowledge that is gained just by sufficiently clear thinking, without having to observe or experiment with objects in the world. For example, knowing that a triangle has three sides is something you can know just because of what it means to be a triangle, hence without having to carefully examine triangular objects that you find throughout the world.
Reasoning: Developing arguments to try and support the truth of one’s beliefs.
Causation: A relation between events, where one event (cause) is responsible for another (effect). Eating too much chocolate can cause the effect of having an upset stomach, and not getting enough sleep can cause someone to be grumpy.
Epistemological Theories: Theories about the nature and possibility of knowledge – whether, when, how, and to what extent we can know about reality, such as the physical world, or our own consciousness. For example, one epistemological theory says that we can gain understanding of our own consciousness by studying the brain, whereas other theories say that we can only gain knowledge of consciousness by reflecting on our own inner experiences.
Aristotle means “happy” in the sense of a person who has developed a complete character, lived a full life, and become a true example of human goodness.
Happy Person – Someone who has developed her entire self well and lived a complete and flourishing life. She is a real and positive example of how we should live.
This is where Aristotle defines virtuous friends. These are friends who you actually answer the phone for. These are the friends who you ask for advice on work, love, and life. They are the friends that celebrate you for being you, but they also tell you when you’re messing things up. Not only do they love you, but you love them and try to be the same kind of friend to them too.
This is where Aristotle defines pleasurable friends. These are your TikTok, Snap Chat, or Instagram friends, the ones you post to social media when you’re having a good time.
This is Aristotle’s explicit definition of useful friends. These are your LinkedIn friends, those who you like networking with at events or enjoy working with on projects.
Virtuous Friendship – A friendship where people set as their goal for their friendship becoming good people together and living happy lives just because they value the good of their friends as persons. These are also known as “perfect” or “true” friendships. They are usually between people who are equally good. And they might be limited to people of equal social status, wealth, and power. Aristotle doesn’t think that any happy person will lack virtuous friends. But he thinks it’s likely that we’ll only have a few of this sort.
Pleasurable Friendship – A friendship where people set as their goal for their friendship some pleasant goal, such as friendship between people who go out on the town together. These friendships are plentiful and easy to form and dissolve.
Useful Friendship – A friendship where two people set as their goal for their friendship some useful or utilitarian purpose, such as friendship between work colleagues. These friendships are plentiful and easy to form and dissolve.
Aristotle uses “friend” broadly for any relationship between people who like each other, wish good things for each other, and get something out of spending time together.
Friendship – A relationship between two people who like each other, generally wish each other well, and have a goal for their interactions.
Happiness – The final end and highest good of human life. The perfect good that objectively fulfills human nature and subjectively satisfies desire.
Happiness Criteria – The conditions that the true object of happiness must satisfy. They are: finality, intrinsic value, purity, internality, authenticity, stability, self-sufficiency, completeness.
Object of Happiness – The thing in which happiness essentially consists, the attainment of which will make us truly happy.
Highest Good – The greatest good for a human being.
Final End – The ultimate goal of human life. All of our other goals are chosen for the sake of this final end.
Constituent Principles – Parts of a material object that cause the object to be the sort of thing that it is, but that cannot be removed from that object (in the way that some properties can be gained or lost). For Aquinas, this would include things such as form (the structure of a material object) and matter (that which is structured). For example, Dylan’s form is his soul, and his matter is his body. His soul and body are distinct, but Dylan could not exist if he were not composed of both.
Accident/accidental property – A property that something can possess or not possess while still remaining the thing that it is. For example, Dylan could grow taller, or he could stop being musical, without becoming a different person. By contrast, rationality is an essential property of Dylan, since being rational is part of the “what it is to be” of a human being.
Subject/Suppositum – Something or someone that can bear properties but is not itself a property that something else can bear. Dylan can have properties, like being short or being musical, but no one can have Dylan as a property.
Property – A feature that an object has. For example, a ball could be orange, which means that the ball has the property of orangeness. In many cases a property can be gained or lost. The ball could be painted green, in which case it would gain the property of greenness and lose the property of orangeness.
Actuality – The being, or act of being, of a thing. For example, hot water is actually hot (the water is hot), even though it is potentially cold. Likewise, a boy is actually a human being (he is a human being), even though he is also potentially a full-grown man (and he will still be an actual human being when he becomes a full-grown man).
Potentiality – Ways a given thing can become different from the way it is now. For example, cold water is potentially hot, since it can be heated up, and an acorn is potentially an Oak tree since it can grow to full size under the right conditions.
Essence – The “what it is to be” of a thing. For example, the essence of a human being is to be a rational animal, and the essence of a cheetah is to be the fastest land animal.
Principle of Specialization – The idea that work is more efficient and more effective if each worker specializes in exactly one task.
Extrinsic Value – Value a thing has that is dependent on something else. Extrinsically valuable things are worth pursuing because they get you something else that is valuable. Money, for instance, is only useful because it can be exchanged for other things.
Intrinsic Value – Value a thing has independently or inherently. Intrinsically valuable things are worth pursuing for their own sake.
Adeimantus and Glaucon were Plato’s older brothers (along with an older sister, Potone). They were both honored for military valor at a battle with Megara. We know little about their lives otherwise. Potone had a son, Speusippus, who inherited leadership of the Academy upon Plato’s death.
Thrasymachus was a real person, who lived about 459-400 BCE moved to Athens from Chalcedon to become a sophist (a professional teacher and public speaker). Only a few fragments of his work survives
Prudence – Prudence is virtue wherein a person is able to choose, in any given situation, the course of action that will lead to greater happiness. For example, a prudential person knows when it is appropriate to continue a difficult conversation and when it is best to wait for a more appropriate time.
Pleasure – Epicurus would have us think about pleasure as coming in two forms: moving and static. Moving pleasures are the type that we experience in the process of satisfying a desire (this coffee tastes amazing!). Static pleasure is the feeling of being satisfied — no longer experiencing need or want (I am feeling so peaceful sitting in the park). Epicurus thinks these static pleasures are the best sort.
Epicurus believed that reality is composed of matter. This sets him apart from other philosophers of the time who, often influenced by Plato, believed that reality is composed of both the material and immaterial (like the soul, or the Platonic forms).
Happiness – Epicurus uses the Greek word “eudaimonia,” which is typically translated into English as “happiness.” Whereas today happiness is most often used to describe a momentary feeling (this new notebook makes me happy!) Epicurus means something more like a consistent state of well-being and contentment.
Unconditioned: an ultimate explanation of reality. For example, if I explain why it is raining today by appealing to some atmospheric conditions, I can always ask for the cause of those conditions, and so on. Only a cause that is not caused by anything else (something unconditioned) would give us an ultimate explanation.
Transcendental Idealism: Kant’s mature philosophical position. It holds that appearances are not things in themselves, but representations of our mind. It is opposed to transcendental realism, which identifies appearances with things in themselves.
Appearances (vs. things in themselves): things as they are experienced by us (also known as phenomena). They should be distinguished from things as they are independently of our experience (things in themselves or noumena).
Metaphysics: the study of what there is. Traditionally, metaphysics is divided into general metaphysics and special metaphysics. The former investigates the general features of reality and asks questions such as ‘What is possible?’. The latter studies particular kinds of being and asks questions such as ‘Does God exist?’ or ‘Is the soul immortal?’.
Reason: the faculty that knows a priori. Kant uses this term in a general sense (the knowing faculty as such) and in a specific sense (the faculty that demands ultimate explanations).
A priori: term denoting propositions that can be known independently from experience. For example, propositions such as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ or ‘The whole is greater than its parts’ can be known without recourse to any experience.
Make sure not to think that ‘unjustified’ means ‘false.’ Even if they are true, the point is just that this would not be something that had been shown.
‘Absolute’ might be a confusing word, here. Socrates means that the geometers are not reasoning about their drawing of the square, for example, but of the square itself. They do not conclude that, for the square they drew, the area is equal to the square of a side – they conclude that this is true for squares as an intelligible object, or, as Plato would say, the Form of the square.
By ‘science’, Plato means to be talking about all rational disciplines, including mathematics.
The form of the beautiful has to be perfectly beautiful because all instances of beautiful things are explained by it, so it has to be responsible for the highest possible degrees of beauty possessed by anything. Moreover, it has no trace of ugliness in it.
The form of the beautiful has to be immaterial because all the many beautiful things do not share any material – that is, they are all made of different stuff.
Form (εἶδος / ἰδέα) – Intelligible, immaterial, perfect entities that explain the unity among the many things which share the feature named by the entity (e.g., Beauty, Squareness, Oddness). For example, think of a square. There might be many different squares, but they all share features like having four sides of equal length. So, the Form of Squareness would include all of those features that make something a square.
Guardian – This is the name Plato gives to the ruling class in his ideal city. Think of them as philosopher kings – they have complete control over the organization of the state. The Republic is partially about why Plato thinks they would be needed for an ideal system of government and what they would need to learn to do the job well.
Plato has previously argued that we are made up of different parts. The first part is the appetitive which is responsible for our desires for food, sex, and other bodily needs. Then there is the spirited part, which longs for fame and honor. Finally, he identifies the rational part, which discerns what is good and bad for us through reason. The parts can all come into conflict with one another, and managing their relations is what Plato thinks justice is all about.
Soul (ψῡχή) – What Greeks meant by this word is controversial. For now, think of it as the thing that makes you different from a rock or other objects, the thinking and experiencing part of you as well as the part of you that acts and makes decision. You might use the word ‘mind’ or ‘self’ to talk about this.
Virtue – Virtues are the character traits that make a person good. For example, most people consider courage and generosity to be virtues. English-speakers usually reserve the word ‘virtue’ for human beings, but in ancient Greek the word can be more comfortably applied to other beings as well.
Was it his burly physique, his wide breadth of wisdom, or his remarkable forehead which earned him this nickname?
Aporia – A Greek term for “being at a loss” or “clueless.” Socrates often questions people until they have no idea how to define something that they thought they understood.
You might be confused by the word ‘attention’ below. In Greek the word is therapeia, from which we get the English word ‘therapy.’ It primarily means the same as ‘service’ as in ‘to serve,’ but shades into ‘worship,’ ‘take care of,’ and ‘attend to.’
Meletus – A poet and citizen of Athens and one of Socrates’ accusers. Amongst other things, Meletus accused Socrates of impiety and corrupting the youth.
Divine Voluntarism – The idea that God is free to determine even the most basic truths. If divine voluntarism is true, then God could have made it so that 2+2=5 or so that cruelty and blasphemy are holy and good.
Euthyphro Dilemma – The question, “Is a thing holy because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is holy?” The general idea of a forced choice (or “dilemma”) about the true order of explanation occurs often in philosophy and gets referred to by this term.
Essence – What a thing fundamentally is. A square might be red or blue without changing the fact that it’s a square, but a square must have four sides, so having four sides is part of a square’s essence.
Definition – The perfect description of a thing. A definition should pick out all and only examples of a thing. For example, ‘bachelor’ might be defined as ‘unmarried man,’ because all unmarried men are bachelors, and only unmarried men are bachelors.
In Disney’s retelling of the Hunchback of Notre Dame, the clergyman Claude Frollo orders the death of many Roma on religious grounds. It is clear, however, that he is really motivated by spite and his unrequited lust for the Romani woman Esmerelda.
Spanish conquistadors were shocked by the scope of ritual human sacrifice among the Aztecs, as hundreds or even thousands of people were sacrificed each year. The Aztecs thought that the sacrifices could repay the sacrifices the gods had made in creating the sun and earth.
Zeus – The god of sky and thunder in ancient Greek mythology, Zeus was depicted as chief among the gods and called the father of the gods and men.
Forms – The perfect, divine, and intelligible entities that exist independently of the physical world. They are comprehensible only through reason, not through our senses, and their existence explains the properties of objects in the physical world.
Recollection – The soul existed prior to birth; during this time it learned everything, and hence all learning is only recalling what we already know.
Immortality of the Soul – Unlike the body, the soul is not subject to physical death, because it is immortal and indestructible.
Philosophy – The practice of preparing the soul for death by training it to think and exist independently of the body
Death – Plato understands this as the soul’s separation from the body
Human Identity Across Time – Locke’s notion that any human stays the same across time if, and only if, it maintains the same (distinctively human) organizing structure of parts.
Substance Identity Across Time – Something is the same substance across a segment of time if, and only if, it continuously exists across the relevant segment of time without gaining or losing any of its parts.
Immaterial Soul – A personal thinking substance without any physical constitution.
Personal Identity Across Time – Whatever makes someone the numerically same person (i.e., that very person) at different times; according to Locke, it is a relation of first-person consciousness via memory.
Person – Locke’s forensic definition of person (pertaining to courts of law regarding the justice of praise, blame, reward, or punishment): a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.
The Prophet Muhammad is a central figure in Islam. He is viewed as the last of a long line of prophets, which includes Moses and Jesus. He is responsible for writing the Quran, which was dedicated to him by the angel Gabriel. His life and sayings are recounted in the Hadith; he is viewed as an exemplary role model of Islamic life and faith.
Exhortation — The method of understanding and interpreting Truth available to the common people. The majority of people take scripture literally and understand truth and right action based upon this understanding. They are persuaded by the vivid imagery of the Quran and the rhetorical exhortations of religious leaders. Averroes takes this to be lowest form of understanding
Dogmatic Discourse — The method of understanding displayed by those who, through natural ability and habit, are able to have a deeper understanding of the Quran, and of the truths it illuminates. These people know that not all of the scriptures are to be taken literally, and that greater underlying Truths are revealed by interpreting some elements allegorically. Still, they err on the side of dogmatism and literal interpretation whenever uncertainty arises. Averroes associates this way of thinking with Muslim theologians and views this to be the middle level of understanding.
Philosophical Inference – The type of understanding associated with philosophical demonstration or argument. This is the highest level of understanding, accomplished by a select few, who have a natural capacity for philosophy and proper philosophical training.
Law — The Quran (the central religious text of Islam) and, to a lesser extent, the Hadith (reports of what the prophet Muhammad said and did). Averroes is concerned with explaining how philosophy relates to what Muslims take to be the unerring Truth regarding God and the nature of existence, as they are expressed in Scripture.
Occasionalism — a theory claiming that God is the only true cause of changes in the world. For example, when you high-five me, you’re not really the cause of the stinging sensation I experience. God is the cause. Your high five is just the occasion on which God causes it.
Interactionism — a theory claiming that things in the world can truly cause changes in each other. For example, when you high-five me, you truly cause me to experience a stinging sensation in my hand.
Substance Dualism — a theory claiming that the mind (or soul) and body are two distinct and very different things.
Body — what it sounds like! The body is the physical part or aspect of a thing and has characteristics like shape, size, etc.
Soul — that part or aspect of a thing involving mental aspects of their existence, e.g., thoughts, feelings, decisions, etc. The “soul”, in this sense, is more or less just the mind.
Causal Interaction — When one thing acts (i.e., itself does something) and in so acting makes another thing change. For example, when you high-five me, you cause me to experience a stinging sensation in my hand.
God as God – The phrase “God as God” is basically a synonym for “God the subject.” In other words, it refers to God precisely in God’s status as an incomprehensible divine Other.
Incarnation – The Christian doctrine of the incarnation is the notion that the word of God became fully human in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It is closely associated with the doctrine of the trinity, which asserts that God the Father, God the Son (Jesus as the word made flesh), and God the Holy Spirit are one God.
Religious Fanaticism – In Feuerbach’s use of the term, a religious fanatic is someone who is unwaveringly faithful to God as an utterly mysterious superhuman being. They subordinate other things—especially the love of other humans—to submission before this divine other.
God the Subject – When Feuerbach refers to God as a subject, he is referring to the commonplace religious belief that God is a being who has various attributes, like a loving nature.
Faith Separates Man From God – Faith separates God from man in this sense: it treats God as a mysterious other, a being radically distinct from us.
Faith – Belief in and fidelity to a transcendent divine subject like God.
Orthodoxy – Orthodoxy refers to “right belief,” and it is concern with identifying heresies and ensuring that people believe and practice correctly.
Indirect Form of Self-Knowledge – Feuerbach’s view is that religious belief is a naive way of relating to our human nature and its perfections. It is naive or childlike because it treats these as external realities that belong to God. He believes a mature and contemplative person realizes these don’t belong to God, but rather to our species, abstractly conceived.
Above the Individual Man – The human perfections are “above the individual” insofar as no particular individual ever perfectly realizes them. They are abstractions.
Divine Trinity – Feuerbach is having fun here. He is using the theological phrasing of the Trinity to talk about human perfections. In calling reason, love, and freedom of the will “divine,” he means they are absolutely good; they are activities whose goodness is intrinsic to their practice or exercise. This isn’t a novel philosophical view. For example, Immanuel Kant argued that autonomy or a good will is the only thing which is unconditionally good.
Perfections – The end to which a faculty or power is ordered. For example, omniscience would be the perfection of the intellect. Traditionally, God is said to possess all perfections.
Love – When Feuerbach writes about love, he is referring to unconditional concern for others and the desire for fellowship with them. He is here asserting that love, understood in this sense, is the perfect activity of the affective faculty. In other words, our feelings and passions are fully actualized and engaged in an intrinsically valuable activity when we genuinely love others.
Infinite – The infinite is whatever can be understood as unbounded or unlimited. Human nature in the abstract is unbounded and unlimited. It is only bounded or limited in its concrete form as it is realized by particular material individuals.
Higher Consciousness – The sort of consciousness that mature human beings possess, but which other animals do not. It is “higher” than animal consciousness because it involves thinking abstractly about the form or essence of things.
Science – Feuerbach uses the term science in its classical sense, meaning systematically organized knowledge. Any body of knowledge founded on an understanding of first principles and the essences of things is a science in this sense.
Popular Sovereignty – The view that a government’s authority to rule comes from the people, making a ruler subject to the will of their citizens.
The Divine Right of Kings – The theory that kings are chosen by God and thus that political revolt is a rebellion against the will of God.
Synthesis – The prefix ‘syn-’ means “together,” so a synthesis “brings together” or combines elements of both a thesis and its antithesis.
Antithesis– An antithesis is the contradiction of a thesis. For example, internationalism could be understood as the antithesis of nationalism.
Thesis – In Hegelian terms, a thesis can be understood as a position or theory. Examples include any of the “-isms” that we discuss in science, history, and philosophy, such as Darwinism, capitalism, nationalism, etc.
Progressor’s Temptation – a unique temptation for those making progress in which pride impedes their further progress and leads to backsliding.
Progressors – those who are not yet expert Stoic practitioners, but who are also aware of the fact that they must change their lives in that direction. They are working on making progress.
Intellectualism – the philosophical view that our motivations and emotions are all judgments. The reason why you do something, your motivation, is because you believe it’s the right thing to do. The reason why you feel good or bad about something, an emotion, is because you believe that something good or bad happened to you.
Duties – acts of service, obedience, and respect that we owe to each other. The duties we owe to each other depend on what kind of relationship we have.
Askeses – exercises of Stoic thought and practice that make the lessons and habits of Stoic philosophy second-nature for Stoic practitioners.
Externals – things that are not under our control but that are all-too-easily confused with things that should be important to us, like wealth, status, and pleasure. Too many people believe externals like these are necessary for the good life, and the Stoic path is to focus not on these things but rather what is up to us.
The Fundamental Division – the division between things that are under our direct control and those that are not. The important lesson is to care only about the things we can control.
The Greatest Happiness Principle – A principle which says that actions are right insofar as they promote happiness and wrong insofar as they promote unhappiness
Higher and Lower Pleasures – Types of pleasures that differ in terms of their quality. Things like food and drugs create lower pleasures. Things like intellectual pursuits and doing the right thing create higher forms of pleasure.
The Doctrine of Swine – An objection that utilitarianism entails that if people would be happy rolling in mud, that’s what would be morally best for them to do, so we should reject the theory.
Utilitarianism – A normative theory of which actions are right or wrong. Utilitarianism says the right action is that which maximises utility.
Jeremy Bentham – Considered by some as the father of utilitarianism, Bentham was a moral philosopher and one of John Stuart Mill’s teachers
Epicurus – an ancient Greek philosopher and one of the first to advocate that the ultimate good is experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain.
Utility – The thing that is ultimately valuable in itself. For Mill, this is happiness, which he then understands as pleasure and the absence of pain.
Contract Theory – a modern political theory identifying consent as the sole justification for government. Contract theory is associated with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and more recently, John Rawls (1921-2002)
Prejudice – a foundational, strongly held, unreasoned (but not necessarily irrational) moral opinion or belief. We might believe, for example, that parents have special obligations towards their own children.
A Priori – a philosophical term of art meaning (in Latin) “prior to experience,” which refers to knowledge that is innate or arrived at purely through reasoning, like the truths of mathematics.
Rights – moral claims invoking immunity from (or entitlement to) some specific treatment (or good) from others. Commonly recognized rights include the right to free speech or the right to healthcare.
Reform – a change in the social order that originates from the existing character of society. An example would be market-based healthcare reform in a capitalist society.
Conservatism – a modern political ideology that aims to preserve and promote the existing (or traditional) institutions of society. These institutions typically include the rule of law, property, the family, and religion.
Contingent Being – A being that can fail to exist. Its existence is not guaranteed. This being might come to exist or it might not.
Necessary Being – A being that can’t fail to exist. Its non-existence is impossible. This also means that such a being has always existed.
Want to read more about why the infinite regress option doesn’t work in the Second Way? Check out Sean Floyd’s entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Efficient Cause – An efficient cause is something that directly makes another thing exist or move. An example of this is when I kick a ball down a hill. I am the efficient cause of the ball rolling down the hill because I make it move down the hill.
Infinite Regress: Begin with some fact. We begin to explain that fact by appealing to another fact, where these facts are related by either causality or dependence. To create the regress, you keep appealing to more and more facts about causality and dependence without end.
Actuality – An ability or action something is currently exercising. Imagine that I am sitting comfortably at my desk, and then I stand up to take a break from reading. In this case, I am now actually standing.
Potentiality – What something has the capacity to do, but isn’t currently doing. Imagine I am sitting comfortably at my desk. Even though I’m not currently standing, I have the capacity to be standing. So, even while I’m not standing, I have the potential to stand.
Theists and Non-Theists – A theist is someone who believes that God exists, while a non-theist does not. Non-theists include atheists, who believe that God does not exist, and agnostics, who are uncertain about whether God exists.
Glaucon – one of Plato’s brothers and one of Socrates’ main interlocutors in the Republic dialogue. In that dialogue, he challenges Socrates to provide a compelling justification for why one should be a just person beyond merely following conventions or avoiding punishment. This sets up Socrates’ defense of justice as intrinsically worthwhile. Throughout the Republic, Glaucon prods Socrates to fully explain his theories of the ideal society, philosopher-kings, and the Form of the Good.
Aristotle – a Greek philosopher (384-322 BC) who studied under Plato and went on to be one of the most influential philosophers to ever live. Simply called “The Philosopher” by Thomas Aquinas and others in the medieval period, Aristotle’s views would eventually be synthesized with Christian theology, laying the intellectual foundation for later scholarly developments in Western Europe.
Understanding – Socrates describes education as turning one’s “understanding” in the right direction. The word “understanding” here translates the ancient Greek term “to phronēsai,” which means “understanding,” “being conscious,” or “having insight.” People who are wicked focus their “understanding” on how best to accomplish their selfish and narrow desires. Those who are wise, in contrast, have learned to focus their “understanding” on what is truly good and beneficial.
The Form of the Good – Socrates characterizes the ultimate goal of education as coming to know “the Form of the Good.” The Form of the Good is his technical term for the meaning of goodness: what it is to be good. Socrates is clear that this “knowledge of the Good” is not simply theoretical knowledge, but also knowledge in the sense of “knowing how”: knowing how to achieve what’s good, to do what’s good, to accomplish what’s good. Mere “book knowledge” or simply being smart is not enough.
The Intelligible – Socrates uses “the intelligible” to name the aspects of the world that we can only grasp through thinking or insight. With my eyes I can see the tree outside my window, but what it means to be a tree is something I can only comprehend in thought. Likewise, I can see the people around me, but human nature, human dignity, and what it means to be human is something I can only grasp conceptually. “The intelligible” is the world insofar as it “makes sense” and can be comprehended.
The Visible – By “the visible,” Socrates means those aspects of the world we can perceive with our five senses and our imagination—those aspects of the world we can see, hear, taste, smell, touch, and imagine. For example, with my eyes I can see the sky, trees, people around me, and so on as visible things. “The visible” is the world insofar as it can be perceived and imagined.
Education – Socrates says that the allegorical story he tells represents the effect of education on human nature. “Education” here is a translation of the ancient Greek word “paideia,” which means “education” in the widest sense of the term. “Paideia” doesn’t mean “education” in the sense of going to school or getting good grades. Instead, it refers to the process of becoming a wise, intelligent, good, and well-rounded human being.
Allegory – An allegory is a symbolic narrative where characters, events, and/or settings represent abstract ideas or convey deeper meanings beyond the literal story. Socrates tells such a symbolic narrative in the passages below. The characters, events, and setting of his narrative symbolize the effect of what he calls “education.”
Self-knowledge – Knowledge of the contents of one’s own mind, such as one’s own beliefs and desires. Self-knowledge can be gained through introspection, that is, by reflecting on what one thinks and experiences. Some philosophers believe that self-knowledge has special properties that our knowledge of the external world lacks, such as being clearer, more reliable, or more valuable.
Dualism – The view that the mind is entirely distinct from the body. This view is usually contrasted with different kinds of monism, which hold that the mind is ultimately just a part of the body (materialism) or that the body is ultimately just a part of the mind (idealism). Dualists hold that the mind and the body are fundamentally different aspects of reality, and both categories are needed to properly describe the universe, especially the human person.
The Self – What the ‘I’ in ‘I am, I exist’ refers to; the part of you that really makes you you. Many philosophers have provided rich accounts of what the self ultimately is, including the soul, the mind, one special feature of the mind (such as consciousness), a mixture of all these elements, or perhaps a mere illusion.
The ‘Cogito’ – Descartes’ famous claim ‘I think, therefore I am’ is often referred to as the cogito. The name comes from the Latin rendering of this phrase, which is ‘cogito, ergo sum.’ Descartes held that one can always believe this proposition with certainty. We cannot doubt our own existence, so the cogito survives his exercise of intense doubt. The cogito appears several times in Descartes’ writings, and he often phrased it slightly differently each time. It appears in the Second Meditation as ‘I am, I exist.’
Certainty – When one believes something with certainty, one is maximally confident that it is true. A certainty is something that is beyond dispute or immune to doubt. Although this captures the basic idea, like many epistemological notions, clarifying precisely what the notion of certainty amounts to is an ongoing area of philosophical research.
Vice – A bad habit that we learn over time through instruction or instinct and that we develop through repetition. What makes the habit bad is that, once we have that habit, our tendency is to do the incorrect thing in certain types of situations. We may choose to do something entirely uncalled for in that situation, or we may act at the wrong time, in the wrong way, to the wrong degree, or with the wrong attitudes, or for the wrong reasons.
Relative Mean – The “Goldilocks amount” of some type of action or emotion. When you act in this way, according to Aristotle, you act exactly as is required under the current circumstances. This means that you do what is called for by the situation at hand, rather than doing something too extreme or not doing something extreme enough. You do something in the moderate amount (the mean amount) relative to the specific situation you are in when you need to act.
Excellence/Virtue – A good habit that we learn over time through instruction and repetition. What makes the habit good is that, once we have that habit, we have a strong tendency to do the right thing at the right time, in the right way, to the right degree, with the right attitudes, whenever we are confronted with a situation that we know calls us to exercise that habit.
Doxastic Voluntarism – the view that we have at least some control over what we believe.
Evidence – information that increases the probability that a claim is true.
Sufficient – enough of something for a particular purpose. Whether something is sufficient is context-dependent.
Solon – In the Histories of Herodotus, Solon visits Croesus, the king of Lydia. Even though Croesus shows Solon all of his wealth, Solon refuses to call him the happiest man who ever lived because he does not know how Croesus will die
Priam – According to Greek mythology, Priam was the final king of Troy during the Trojan War. Despite his wealth and political power, he was killed by Achilles’ son Neopotolemus during the Sack of Troy
Virtue – The consistent and reliable tendency to perform one’s function excellently. When a person has a certain virtue, like courage, they have spent time developing the habit, in this case reacting to danger well, using their human abilities. The virtues then make it possible for us to live a life of flourishing
Sardanapalus – An Assyrian king described by the historian Diodorus as living a life of extreme decadence. Sardanapalus indulged himself with food, alcohol, and many concubines, even going so far to say that physical gratification is the purpose of life. Chrysippus said that, on his tomb is inscribed the following: “Though knowing full well that thou art but mortal, indulge thy desire, find joy in thy feasts. Dead, thou shalt have no delight […] I have only what I have eaten, what wantonness I have committed, what joys I received through passion; but my many rich possessions are now utterly dissolved.”
Function – the characteristic activity of a given thing which makes it what it is. The function of a knife is cutting, while the function of a heart is to pump blood
Eudaimonia – Frequently translated as ‘happiness’, eudaimonia means the attainment of active human flourishing, and is the end Aristotle identifies as humanity’s highest final good
Final Good – A good that we pursue for its own sake. Common examples of final goods include happiness, knowledge, and friendship
Instrumental Good – A good that we pursue for the sake of some other good. A common example is money, as money allows us to purchase other kinds of goods
Anytus – an Athenian politician, war general, and one of the primary accusers behind Socrates’ prosecution. Anytus feared that Socrates would undermine the young Athenian democracy he had helped create and defend
Oracle of Delphi – the high priestess at the temple at Delphi, the oracle was one of the most sought after seers of the ancient world and was thought to relay messages from the god Apollo
Chaerephon – an ancient Greek from the city Sphettus, Chaerephon is remembered as a loyal friend of Socrates, also making an appearance in two other Platonic dialogues, the Charmides and the Gorgias
Meletus – A poet and citizen of Athens and one of Socrates’ accusers. Amongst other things, Meletus accused Socrates of corrupting the youth
Apollo – the ancient sacred site Delphi was dedicated to the god Apollo, an ancient Greek god and the god that Socrates refers to throughout the Apology
Virtue – a character trait, acquired through habitual practice, that enables one to act well. The virtues can also be thought of as excellences of human character, as they make it possible for us to live a life of flourishing. Examples of the virtues include courage, prudence, and justice
The Evil Demon Argument – Argues that we cannot hold any of our beliefs with certainty because we could be radically deceived by an evil demon. A classic argument given by Descartes for doubting the reliability of almost all of our beliefs
Philosophical Skepticism – The position that we do not know many things that we ordinarily take ourselves to know
A Posteriori Knowledge – Knowledge that can only be acquired through having particular, concrete experiences. Such knowledge can be gained simply through our everyday experiences, or through more complex means like controlled scientific experiments
A Priori Knowledge – Knowledge that can be gained without having any particular concrete experiences. Such knowledge is typically gained by rational insight or intuition
Cartesian Method of Doubt – A process employed by René Descartes of rejecting all beliefs that he had at least some reason to doubt in order to see if he had any beliefs that he could know with certainty
Revelation – Theological truths that have been made known by means of some religious text, testimony, authority, or experience, or the act or process in which such truths are made known.
Rationalism – The view that the only reliable means of coming to know truths about God is reason. As a result, what we might otherwise believe by means of faith ought to be disregarded or even rejected in favor of what we must believe by means of reason.
Fideism – The view that the only reliable means of coming to know truths about God is faith. As a result, what we might otherwise believe by means of reason ought to be disregarded or even rejected in favor of what we must believe by means of faith.
Faith – The act of accepting a proposition as true for which there is less than demonstrable evidence, which rises above mere opinion but falls short of logical or scientific demonstration. Faith can also refer to a particular religious tradition or the body of beliefs that are central to that religious tradition.
Virtue – a character trait, acquired through habitual practice, that enables one to act well. The virtues can also be thought of as excellences of human character, as they make it possible for us to live a life of flourishing. Examples of the virtues include courage, prudence, and justice
Socratic Ignorance – an awareness of one’s own ignorance, and the reason that Socrates was deemed wise by the Oracle of Delphi. A person who lacks Socratic Ignorance may believe they know many things they actually don’t, leading them to overestimate how well they understand the world
Apology – a formal defense of justification of an action or belief. A Christian apologist, for example, is someone who defends their faith and seeks to justify it through an appeal to reason.
